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Abstract 
The Chinese banking sector, which is characterized by large government ownership, has 
played a special role in allocating credit towards inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
while it has been difficult for faster growing private enterprises to obtain bank loans. In this 
thesis I explore how such a misallocation of resources affects the Chinese economy, from a 
theoretical point of view. I have looked at the recent history of the Chinese economy, and its 
ongoing transition from a planned economy towards a market economy, as well as the 
development of the banking sector.  
Despite China’s impressive rate of economic growth during the past 36 years, its financial 
system, which is dominated by the banking sector, has not played an important role in 
allocating resources towards its best use. Several studies have shown that most private 
Chinese enterprises rely on informal financial markets, or their own savings, in order to 
finance investment projects (see, e.g., Ayyagari et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2005)). I present 
some key theories of the roles banks play in an economy, such as creating liquidity for its 
depositors, monitoring borrowers and reducing the depositors’ risk by diversification, roles 
which informal markets may not be as efficient in providing. I also explore a model of soft 
budget constraints, where the government affects the state-owned banks’ lending in order to 
achieve welfare maximizing goals, rather than profit maximizing goals. Providing bank credit 
to unprofitable SOEs may crowd out more profitable private projects which will not be able to 
obtain financing.  
I also discuss some rational reasons of the banks’ preferential treatment of SOEs. I consider 
how the role of collateral affects the banks’ willingness to give loans. If SOEs are more 
capable than the private enterprises in offering collateral, the banks may prefer to lend to the 
SOEs because their loans will be safer. I present a model that aims to explain how a bank’s 
collateral requirements and preferential interest rates to SOEs will affect the speed of 
economic transition in China, from an economy dominated by SOEs towards an economy 
dominated by more efficient private firms.   
 
 
VI 
 
 
 
VII 
 
Preface 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Diderik Lund, professor at the Department of 
Economics at the University of Oslo, for his time, and his helpful comments.  
The decision of writing my master’s thesis on the subject of inefficiency in the Chinese 
banking sector is a result of spending the fall semester of 2013 as an exchange student at 
Fudan University in Shanghai, China.   
I truly appreciate the experience of studying at one of China’s best universities, and would 
like to thank the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo, and the School of 
Economics at Fudan University, for making my stay possible.  
VIII 
 
Table of contents 
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
2 Resource allocation .........................................................................................................3 
2.1 Model of efficiency loss due to credit discrimination ................................................4 
3 A brief review of China’s economic history ....................................................................9 
3.1 China’s transition from planned economy to market economy ................................ 10 
3.2 Facts about China today ......................................................................................... 12 
4 Recent history of China’s banking sector ...................................................................... 15 
4.1 Informal financial system ....................................................................................... 18 
5 Literature review........................................................................................................... 20 
5.1 Defying China’s comparative advantage ................................................................. 20 
5.2 The effects of government intervention on bank lending ......................................... 21 
5.3 Misallocation and total factor productivity.............................................................. 26 
6 The role of banks .......................................................................................................... 30 
6.1 Creating liquidity ................................................................................................... 31 
6.2 Monitoring and diversification ............................................................................... 35 
7 Soft budget constraint ................................................................................................... 38 
7.1 A model of soft budget constraints ......................................................................... 39 
7.2 Crowding out profitable investment ........................................................................ 49 
8 The importance of collateral ......................................................................................... 57 
8.1 Effect on the economy ............................................................................................ 60 
9 Structural effects on the economy of giving preferential loans to SOEs ......................... 63 
9.1 Model: Two types of firms and two industries ........................................................ 63 
10 Concluding remarks ...................................................................................................... 71 
 
IX 
 
List of tables and figures 
Table 1: Shares of World GDP, 1700-2003 ........................................................................... 12 
Table 2: Nonperforming loans in China’s banking system .................................................... 16 
Figure 1: China’s economic growth ...................................................................................... 24 
Figure 2: China’s nominal GDP ............................................................................................ 24 
Figure 3: Nonperforming bank loans to total gross loans (%) in China .................................. 25 
Table 3: Payoffs under centralization .................................................................................... 41 
Table 4: Payoffs under decentralization ................................................................................ 42 
Table 5: Payoffs with a state owned bank concerned about unemployment from terminating 
SOE projects ........................................................................................................................ 44 
Table 6: Payoffs ................................................................................................................... 50 
Table 7. Timing table ........................................................................................................... 51 
Figure 4: Efficiency loss from preferential interest rate to SOEs ........................................... 67 
Figure 5: Marginal productivity of capital and investment levels .......................................... 68 
 
 
  
X 
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
The Chinese financial system has been described as underdeveloped and dominated by the 
banking sector, with state-owned banks controlling the largest share of this market (e.g., Firth 
et al. (2009), Naughton (2007, p. 451ff) and Allen et al. (2012)). The Chinese banking system 
has been giving a disproportionately large share of credit to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
while firms in the private sector have had difficulty in, or been excluded from, obtaining bank 
credit (Ayyagari et al. (2010) and Berger et al. (2007)). 
The Chinese private sector has been growing faster than the SOE sector in recent years, and 
private enterprises have been more efficient, meaning that they have been able to produce 
more output using less input, than the SOEs on average. Channeling most of the credit in the 
banking system towards the least efficient group of enterprises is not an optimal allocation of 
resources, and deserves some attention.  
In this thesis I will show why such an allocation is not optimal, as well as investigate some of 
the economic theories of banking, to see if they can help explain the phenomenon, and why 
the problem may sustain. Key topics include moral hazard, cost of screening and monitoring, 
soft budget constraints and collateral.  
The Chinese economy has been in the process of transition from a command economy 
towards a market economy, with a correspondingly high economic growth rate for more than 
three decades. The fact that the country is the world’s second biggest economy and the most 
populous one makes it particularly interesting.  
Even though China gradually started moving from a command economy towards a market 
economy as early as in 1978, the economy is still not as developed, and not as open as most 
other market economies. China still controls the capital account of the economy and the 
Chinese currency, the yuan, cannot be freely traded yet. In the banking sector there is a ceiling 
on deposit interest rates that is quite low, giving depositors a low return on their money. 
However because of limited investment possibilities due to capital controls, and a very high 
savings rate, the banking sector attracts a lot of deposits. 
In chapter 2, I will present some theory of efficient resource allocation, focusing on how the 
economy is affected by the banks’ allocation of their credit. In chapter 3 I will give a brief 
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review of China’s economic history, and highlight some of the economic challenges China 
faces today. In chapter 4 I will give a short introduction to the recent history of the Chinese 
banking sector. In chapter 5 I will review some of the relevant literature. In chapter 6 I will 
focus on the role banks play in an economy, and some of the economic theory that is 
particular to banking. In chapter 7 I will discuss the soft budget constraint problem. In chapter 
8 I will show how a lack of collateral can explain the private firms’ limited access to banking 
credit. In chapter 9 I will show in a model with two sectors, labor intensive and capital 
intensive, how the banks’ lending policy affects the speed of transition towards a more 
efficient economy, as well as the structural composition of the economy. In chapter 10 there 
are some concluding remarks.  
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2 Resource allocation  
How does the credit allocation of the banks affect the output of the economy?  
One of the most important roles of financial markets is to allocate resources from those with 
surplus savings towards those with a demand for credit. Since banks are dominant in the 
Chinese financial system, I will focus on the banks’ influence on resource allocation. How 
efficiently the banking capital is allocated will affect the growth of the economy. Limited 
credit access to private firms will reduce the number of profitable projects in the economy, 
and thus reduce overall growth. Those firms that do not get access to loans from the banking 
sector have to either save up enough to finance their own projects using retained earnings, or 
borrow from some informal lending institution, often at a much higher interest rate. 
Alternatively firms may issue bonds, or get listed on a stock exchange in order to raise 
money, but these two alternatives are usually only available for very large firms, and not a 
viable option for most private enterprises in China. 
According to a report by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State 
Council, P.R. China (2013, p. 144), the corporate bonds outstanding in China were only equal 
to 8.6% of GDP in 2010, while the total assets of banking institutions and total stock market 
capitalization were 241.6% and 66.7% of GDP respectively.  
Allen et al. (2005) finds that the private sector dominates the state and listed sector in terms of 
growth, size and output over the years 1996 – 2002. While the private sector’s industrial 
output grew at an annual rate of 14.3 %, the state and listed sectors grew at only 5.4 % in the 
same period. 
The reasons why the banking sector prefers to give loans mostly to SOEs can be many. 
Political or ideological goals instead of profit maximizing goals, easier access to credit 
information on SOEs or lower credit risk because the government may bail out defaulting 
SOEs are some of the explanations pointed out by Brandt and Li (2003). In chapter 7 I will 
discuss how the SOEs obtain more bank finance due to political goals, where the state-owned 
banks not only maximize profits but also care about employment in SOEs. In chapter 8 I will 
consider how a difference in collateral may be responsible for the banks’ preference towards 
SOEs. Regardless of the banks’ reasoning, I will in this chapter present a short model that 
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intuitively shows how restricting credit to one group of the economy will reduce overall 
economic growth, and that it is an inefficient allocation.  
2.1 Model of efficiency loss due to credit 
discrimination 
2.1.1 Resource allocation with separate interest rates 
Using a simple model, I will show how a preferential interest rate to SOEs compared to that 
of private firms leads to an efficiency loss to the economy.  
Consider an economy with full competition and two profit-maximizing firms. The two firms 
differ only in ownership, privately owned and state-owned, in order to match the Chinese 
story. They both have an investment project they want to get financed, but because the project 
is costly, and they have no money, they need to obtain a bank loan in order to finance their 
project.  
They produce consumption goods, using capital and labor,    =   (  ,   ) 
      =  (  ,   )   −     −      (1) 
 
Equation (1) describes the SOE profit, which is the production function  ( ,  ), multiplied 
with the price,    is the wage rate,   is the amount of labor hours, and    is the interest rate 
paid to a bank on the firms fixed capital investments. 
    =     ,      −     −     (2) 
 
Equation (2) shows the corresponding equation for the private firm, where   =   (1 +  ), 
where   > 0, and reflects that there is an interest rate differential between the private firm and 
the SOE. The private firm has to pay a premium on the interest rate, so they pay a relatively 
higher price on capital.  
The capital and labor stock in the economy are exogenously given.  
Both firms maximize their profits, and the first order conditions yield:  
  
  (  ,   )   −   = 0 (3) 
  
  (  ,   )   −    = 0 (4) 
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  
    ,      −   = 0 (5) 
  
     ,      −   = 0 
 
(6) 
By inserting for,   =   (1 +  ), into equation (6), we get,  
   
     ,      −   (1 +  ) = 0 (6’) 
One implication of the first order conditions is that,  
 
 
(1 +  )
  
 (  ,   )
  
  (  ,   )
=
  
  (  ,   )
  
  (  ,   )
 
(7) 
 
We see that the marginal technical rate of substitution is smaller in the private firm than in the 
SOE, because it follows from (7) that,  
   
 (  ,   )
  
  (  ,   )
<
  
  (  ,   )
  
  (  ,   )
 
(8) 
 
The result from (7) and (8) implies that there is an efficiency loss,  , resulting from the 
interest rate difference, and the efficiency in the economy would be improved if capital was 
reallocated from the SOE towards the private firm.  
2.1.2 Only bank lending 
Consider an economy with two firms that differ only in ownership, privately owned and state-
owned. Each firm has an investment project it wants to get financed. Assuming that the firms 
have no initial wealth they need to obtain a bank loan in order to finance the project. They are 
both qualitatively equal, meaning that both firms’ projects have the same positive expected 
mean return with equal variance.  
A project costs    = 1 to finance, and gives a return   to the firm, which has to pay   = 1 +
 , to the bank, where   is the interest rate. Thus the return to a firm is, 
    =   −   > 0 (9) 
 
And the return to the bank is,  
    =   −   > 0  (10) 
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It is assumed that the bank’s opportunity cost of lending is zero.  
The social surplus of extending a loan is    +    =   −   > 0. 
The social surplus of extending two loans is, 2  − 2  >   −  . If the bank for whatever 
reason will only give a loan to one project, the result is an efficiency loss of size,   −  . 
In this simple scenario, it is obvious that restricting access to bank lending for one group of 
firms will reduce the overall social surplus, and reduce the output of the economy. The above 
model may be very unrealistic, in that no private firms obtain any bank loans. The model 
could be altered to allow some private firms to get finance, but as long as a slightly less 
productive SOE is preferred to a slightly more productive private firm, there is room for 
improvement of the resource allocation.  
2.1.3 Introducing informal lending sector 
The size of the loss of output in the economy, due to the banks’ no-lending policy to private 
firms, depends on the private firms’ ability to obtain credit somewhere else. We can now 
assume that the firm that is denied credit from the banking sector can alternatively get a loan 
from an informal lending sector, which requires a higher interest rate1.  
The informal lender requires an interest rate    = 1 +  ̂, where  ̂ >   ⇨    >  . 
Now as long as   >   , the total surplus seems to be the same. The return from the project to 
the SOE, which has access to bank funding is the same as before,  
      =   −   > 0 (11) 
 
While the return to the private firm’s project is,  
     =   −    > 0 (12) 
 
The return to the bank is,  
    =   −   > 0  (13) 
                                               
1 Informal lenders that charge high interest rates are common in China. If a firm cannot get credit from a bank, or 
borrow from family or friends, the firm may borrow from private money houses, or underground lending 
organizations that charge high interest rates (Ayyagari et al., 2010). 
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And the informal lenders return is,  
     =    −   (14) 
 
The social surplus is thus unchanged, 
      +     +    +     =   −   +   −    +   −   +    −   = 2  − 2  (15) 
 
The total social surplus is not affected even though the private firm has to borrow at a higher 
interest rate from an informal lender. The reduction in profits to the private firm relative to the 
profits it would obtain with access to bank finance is a pure transfer to the informal lender, 
and does not affect the total output in the economy.  
The unchanged result rests on the assumption that   >   . It is however easy to see that if 
  <   , then there will be a output loss. In a richer model with many private firms, we could 
also think that there are many firms with different payoffs. All the private firms with   ∈
( ,   ) will be forced to abandon projects that would have been profitable if they could get 
access to bank credit, but will not be undertaken due to the high interest rates in the informal 
lending market. 
The point of the above model was to show that there is an output loss related to the restriction 
of bank credit to private firms. It is clear that the interest rate differential between the informal 
market and the bank sector will affect how large the output loss is.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that a higher interest rate may lead to higher riskiness of the 
projects, by an adverse selection effect and an incentive effect, where borrowers gets 
incentives to increase the risk, leading to an overall reduction in expected value. Borrowers’ 
behavior might change towards higher risk taking when the interest rate increases; because a 
higher interest rate will, ceteris paribus, reduce the borrowers expected return on a project. 
They show that credit rationing may be an optimal choice for a bank rather than increasing the 
interest rate to clear the market.  
In order to understand why the Chinese banking system has allocated its resources mainly 
towards less efficient SOEs, rather than more efficient private enterprises, a review of the  
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history of the Chinese economy and banking system will be presented in the following 
chapters.  
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3 A brief review of China’s economic 
history 
 According to Maddison (2007), China had been the world’s biggest economy for nearly two 
thousand years, but in the 1890s the United States took over this position. China’s share of 
world GDP was about one third in 1820, even though GDP per capita was a bit below the 
world average. China’s economy deteriorated relative to the rest of the world and in 1952 
China’s share of world GDP was only 5.2%, despite having about 22% of the world’s total 
population. Between 1820 and 1952 China’s GDP actually declined at about 0.10% annually, 
while Europe and the United States had annual growth at 1.71% and 3.76% respectively 
during the same period. China was lagging behind, and China’s share of world GDP dropped 
to 4.9% in 1978.  
The following section is to a large degree taken from Brandt and Rawski (2008, p. 4ff). The 
People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 under the leadership of Mao Zedong. The 
Chinese economy was shaped after the Soviet model, and the major characteristics of the 
economic system was that it was dominated by state-owned enterprises, prices had little 
practical importance2, and goods were produced and distributed according to the 
government’s plan. During Mao’s period3 the economy’s growth was not reaching its 
potential due to several inefficiencies. Limited competition between enterprises, and 
collective farming, did not give much incentive to innovate or increase efficiency in 
production, and the country had very limited trade with other nations. Misallocation of 
resources was bound to be widespread. There was no price mechanism, supply and demand 
for goods were determined by government planners, and there was scarcity of essential 
consumer goods due to a focus on investment goods.  
In 1953 China started to focus on heavy industries, known as a Big Push strategy. The social 
planners channeled investments into capital intensive industries, rapidly increasing industrial 
output (Naughton, 2007, p. 56 and Lin, 2012, p. 85). Lin (2012, p. 97) calls this a 
                                               
2 With government planners deciding what and how much to be produced of most goods, prices did not play an 
important role in allocating resources. Prices were under government control, and set in accordance to their 
strategies. While prices typically affect supply and demand in a market economy (or vice versa), in the command 
economy of China, however, prices were mostly used as a way to keep account of production and investment 
(Naughton, 2007, p. 59f and Brandt and Rawski, 2008, p. 4). According to Naughton (2007, p.380f), prices in 
the world markets did not affect domestic prices either, since imports were re-priced in order to protect domestic 
industry.  
3 By Mao’s period, I refer to the period from 1949 until Mao’s death in 1976.  
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“comparative advantage defying” strategy which reduced output and productivity. However 
he claims that the biggest source of loss to the economy in this period did not come from the 
strategy of prioritizing heavy industries, but that the workers had few incentives and low 
enthusiasm.  
One of the worst examples of misallocation of resources under Mao’s leadership was a 
disastrous economic experiment known as the Great Leap Forward, between 1958 and 1960. 
In an attempt to grow the industrial production in China, many farmers where moved from 
food production in the agricultural sector, to work at rural factories and particularly in steel 
production. The reduction in food production, as well as bad weather in 1960, resulted in a 
famine that caused about 25-30 million deaths (Naughton, 2007, p. 69ff).   
According to Naughton (2007, p. 379), China’s trade with the outside world was very limited, 
and in 1970-1971, the total imports and exports combined, were together only 5% of GDP. 
This stands in stark contrast with the size and importance global trade has in China’s 
economy today. According to statistics from The World Bank4, China’s total foreign trade 
was as high as 70% of GDP in 2006, and has since declined relative to GDP to about 52% in 
2012.  
In 1978, two years after Mao’s death, the Communist party, under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, initiated the first reforms of the economic system. 1978 thus marks the starting 
point of China’s gradual and ongoing economic transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy. I refer to the Chinese economic transition as a process that is still ongoing 
in 2014, 36 years after reforms started. The reason is that there are still some areas of the 
economy that are being reformed in the direction of letting the markets play a larger role, with 
less government interventions. Some of the anticipated reforms include opening up the capital 
account, liberalizing the currency and reforming the financial system.  
3.1 China’s transition from planned economy to 
market economy 
According to Naughton (2007, p. 88f), experimental reforms of the planned economy system 
were launched in several parts of the economy by the end of 1978. One of the initial successes 
                                               
4 The World Bank: World Development Indicators dataset, April 2014 version. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/archive/WDI_excel_2014_04.zip 
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of reform started in the agricultural sector that year. In the years prior to reform the 
agricultural sector was collectivized, and communities shared the land and what they could 
grow from it. Prices had been kept at low levels, and farmers had little incentives to increase 
their investments in agriculture. The degree of collectivization was then reduced when farmer 
households were given the opportunity to sign contracts with the collectives giving them 
control over individual pieces of land, as well as increased autonomy regarding what crops to 
grow. In the same period the government decided to increase the prices on agricultural goods, 
in order to improve conditions for the farmers. The contracting of land to farmer households, 
together with an increase in the prices of agricultural goods, helped give farmers incentives to 
increase their efforts and, as a result production of grain increased by more than one third 
between 1978 and 1984 (Naughton, 2007, p. 89). 
One of the key initial reform strategies was the Dual Track System, which allowed a gradual 
change from planned to market economy, by allowing the two market forms to coexist. Under 
the planned economy, economic agents produced their output according to the plan. Under the 
Dual Track System the economic agents still had to fulfill their pre-determined quotas at set 
prices, while any production above the plan was allowed to be sold at market determined 
prices, which were typically higher than the price they received on the planned quota (Qian, 
2002). In 1984 the government fixed the planned quotas, and since the economy was growing, 
this allowed the economic agents to grow out of the plan, with more and more of their 
production being allocated at market determined prices (Naughton, 2007, p. 92).    
The Chinese economy was pretty autarkic during the planned economy years, and one of the 
major changes in China has been the opening up of the economy to the outside world, 
particularly with respect to trade in goods. As previously mentioned the reform of China’s 
economic system has been gradual, and in the years after 1978 there were still strict quotas 
and limits on all foreign trade. According to Branstetter and Lardy (2008, p. 634f), tariffs on 
imports actually increased in the early years of the reform period in the 1980s, and stood at an 
average rate of 56% in 1982, before they were gradually reduced in the 1990s, and further 
lowered to an average rate of 15% at the time of China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. China focused on attracting foreign direct investments (FDI), 
by lowering barriers, and removed tariffs on processing trade, i.e., imports of goods that are 
processed or assembled in China, and then exported again. One of the measures to attract FDI 
was the establishment of four special economic zones, where foreign firms could get 
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preferential taxes and administrative treatment. These zones proved successful and later more 
areas where given similar status, in order to attract more FDI (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008, p. 
640).   
 By the mid 1990s, China had successfully adopted a functioning market economy, even 
though the process of market transition is not complete (Naughton, 2007, p. 85). By 2003 
China’s GDP as share of world GDP had risen to 15.1%, from a low of 4.9% in 1978 
(Maddison, 2007). Table 1 shows a comparison of China and some other major regions, and 
how the sizes of their economies have developed over the years, from 1700 to 2003.  
Shares of World GDP, 1700-2003 
(per cent) 
  1700 1820 1952 1978 2003 
China 22.3 32.9 5.2 4.9 15.1 
India 24.4 16.0 4.0 3.3 5.5 
Japan 4.1 3.0 3.4 7.6 6.6 
Europe 24.9 26.6 29.3 27.8 21.1 
United States 0.1 1.8 27.5 21.6 20.6 
USSR 4.4 5.4 9.2 9.0 3.8 
Source: Maddison (2007, Table 2.2a) 
Table 1: Shares of World GDP, 1700-2003 
3.2 Facts about China today 
China is the world’s most populous nation with 1354 million inhabitants.  As late as in 1980, 
80.61% of the population was living in rural areas. Since 1980 there has been a rapid rate of 
urbanization, and today China has an urban population of 52.57% and only 47.43% are living 
in rural areas, according to official figures5. Urbanization is a vital part of China’s 
development process, as many people move from agriculture to working in industrial and 
service sectors (Naughton, 2007, p. 126). According to China Statistical Yearbook 20136, the 
                                               
5 China Statistical Yearbook 2013, 3-1 Population and its Composition, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
6 China Statistical Yearbook 2013, 11-2 Per Capita Annual Income and Engel’s Coefficient of Urban and Rural 
Households 
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per capita annual disposable income of urban households in 2012 was 245657 yuan, while the 
rural households’ disposable income was only 7917 yuan, only about one third that of the 
urban households. With such huge differences in average income between rural and urban 
areas, it is no surprise that China is experiencing rapid urbanization. The Chinese citizens 
have, however, not been able to move freely from rural to urban areas in the past, and there 
are still some restrictions. Naughton (2007, p. 124) explains how only those with urban 
residence permits, called hukou, have the right to permanently live in cities. The citizens 
inherit their parents’ status of registration, which specifies their location and status, either 
rural or urban. This system has not stopped urbanization, but without a permanent urban 
residence permit rural migrants that move to cities are not entitled to the same social rights as 
inhabitants with urban hukou.  
China has experienced amazing economic growth since economic reforms started in 1978, 
with an annual growth rate of about 10%8 between 1978 and 2012. As a result 500 million 
Chinese have been brought out of poverty (World Bank and the Development Research 
Center of the State Council, P.R. China, 2013, p. 4).  
On the other hand some imbalances have risen during this period, posing challenges for China 
in the years to come. There are several papers published regarding the imbalances in the 
Chinese economy (e.g., Deer and Song (2012), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006) and Fukumoto 
and Muto (2012)). The savings rate in China is very high, and the growth in the economy has 
been driven by high investments, while the level of private consumption is very low. Private 
consumption as a share of nominal GDP was only 33.8 %9 in 2010 according to Fukumoto 
and Muto (2012). Savings have been running ahead of investments, and exports running 
ahead of imports. China has a widening trade surplus that, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006) 
describe as an imbalance when it was growing at a rate of US$30 billion in 2004. Since then 
the trade surplus has only increased, and by the end of 2013 the foreign exchange reserves 
stood at US$3.82 trillion, up from US$3.31 trillion at the end of 2012, according to the 
People’s Bank of China10.   
                                               
7 100 CNY was 92.25 NOK on average during 2012, according to Norges Bank. 24565 CNY = 22661 NOK.  
8 9.92% annual growth on average from 1978 to 2012, according to World Development Indicators 2013 from 
the World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
9 Fukumoto and Muto (2012) compare China with the following countries: Japan (58.6 %), USA (70.6 %), Korea 
(52.5 %), Thailand (53.7 %), Indonesia (56.7 %) and India (61.9 %). The number in parenthesis is private 
consumption as a share of GDP in 2010 in the respective countries. 
10 See People’s Bank of China (2013) and People’s Bank of China (2014). 
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Safety nets have weakened, especially hurting rural households, which are already the 
poorest. Fukumoto and Muto (2012) show that China’s investment driven growth path has not 
provided as much benefit to the households as the increased GDP numbers might indicate, 
because the consumption to GDP ratio is the lowest among major emerging economies. They 
suggest increased development of the service sector as a necessary means to increase 
consumption. A shift towards a larger service industry and more consumption relative to 
investments, could also contribute to solve the challenges that China face with pollution.  
Deer and Song (2012) propose reform of China’s financial system as one measure to 
rebalance China’s economy. They claim that the state-owned commercial banking sector 
gives preferential interest rates on loans to SOEs, which reinforces the investment and 
expenditure imbalances. It also forces private enterprises to rely on the informal credit 
system.  
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4 Recent history of China’s banking 
sector 
The following section is largely derived from Mishkin (2013, p. 374). Before economic 
reform in China started in 1978, the Chinese banking system consisted of only one bank, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), which was established in December 1948. During the planned 
economy period, there was no room for any more banks and private banks were prohibited. 
PBC acted as the only bank, undertaking both commercial banking and central banking roles. 
Reform of the banking system started in 1980, and the commercial banking activities of PBC 
were divided into four state-owned banks, while PBC later continued only as the central bank. 
The four state-owned banks, the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), 
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) were established. According to Berger et al. (2007), the four banks were initially 
restricted to serve their own designated sectors of the economy, as their names indicate. 
However in 1985 they were allowed to compete in all sectors, but because they mainly served 
as policy-lending banks for the government, and had lacking incentives to compete, 
competition was initially very limited.  
These above mentioned banks are known as the “Big Four”, and are important and large 
banks today, even though their share of total bank lending has decreased, as more banks have 
later been allowed to enter the banking sector. According to Naughton (2007, p. 456), the Big 
Four accounted for 53% of the total market share in Chinese banking industry in 2005. 
In 1990 two stock exchanges were established in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. They have experienced rapid growth since the start, however, 
the stock exchanges have not been a very successful arena for private enterprises to attract 
funding.  According to Naughton (2007 p. 469f), the listed companies are mostly former 
SOEs, and the government has remained the majority owner in many of these companies by 
keeping a certain share of the stocks as non-tradable. He points out that in the first decade 
after 1990, as much as 90% of the listings were SOEs. Hence the stock markets have been 
similar to the state-owned banking sector in that they mostly fund enterprises controlled by 
the government.   
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At the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s the Big Four had serious problems 
with a huge amount of non-performing loans. According to Naughton (2007, p. 460), the 
banking system provided loans to loss-making firms, due to government control over the 
lending decisions. According to Dobson and Kashyap (2006), the government wanted to shift 
the allocation of credit away from direct government transfers and to go via the banking 
system, which is one of the reasons for the buildup of non-performing loans in the banking 
sector. Unproductive firms relied on bank loans to keep afloat, and their debt levels steadily 
increased. The result was that by 2002, the percentage of loans that were nonperforming for 
state-owned banks reached 26.2%, and consisted mainly of loans to SOEs (Naughton, 2007, 
p. 462).  
 Nonperforming loans in China’s banking 
system 
 
 State-owned banks  
Year Percent of loans Billion yuan 
2002 26.2 2088 
2003 20.4 1917 
2004 15.6 1575 
2005 10.5 1072 
Source: Naughton (2007, p. 462) 
Table 2: Nonperforming loans in China’s banking system 
Table 2 shows that the amount of nonperforming loans has been gradually declining, from 
2002, when more than one quarter of all loans was nonperforming.   
To reduce the problems of the large amount of non-performing loans the Big Four banks were 
saved by the government’s establishment of four asset-management corporations, one for 
each of the “Big Four”, which took over their bad loans. In addition the government injected 
funds to recapitalize the banks. The banks were essentially bailed out by the government (see, 
e.g., Naughton, 2007, p. 462f).  
As a measure to improve the efficiency of the banking sector, China’s central government 
started reforming the ownership structure of the Big Four state-owned commercial banks by 
listing them on the stock exchange. The Big Four banks have all been listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange during the 2000s. They are still however controlled by the state which is the 
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majority owner.11  
To get a grasp of the size of the Big Four, they are all among the top 9 of the world’s largest 
publicly traded corporations12, claiming the top three places, according to Forbes Global 2000 
(2014), with ICBC ranked as the largest corporation in the world, CCB is the second largest, 
and ABC and BOC as 3rd and 9th respectively.  
Both BOC and ICBC are considered as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) as of 
November 2013, according to the Financial Stability Board (2013). A total of 29 global banks 
are considered G-SIBs, and they are required to hold additional common equity loss 
absorbency13, as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. This is one of the measures that the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced in order to improve the resilience of 
banks and banking systems, and to reduce the probability of failure of global systemically 
important banks (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). 
One of the reasons why the “Big Four” have been making large profits in recent years, despite 
of their inefficiencies, is that the banks in China benefit from restrictions on the interest rates 
on deposits. There are ceilings on the deposit rates, which reduce the competition between 
banks, since they cannot offer higher interest on deposits in order to attract more deposits 
(Song et al., 2013). There is a quite high interest rate differential between the deposit rates 
and the loan rates, which generates large profits for the banks. If the ceiling on deposits will 
be removed, one may expect that the increased competition for deposits will push the interest 
rates on deposits up, and reduce the interest rate differential between deposits and loan rates, 
such that these high profits will be reduced. This will benefit those who save as they get a 
higher return on their money, and increased competition should also increase the efficiency of 
                                               
11 According to the shareholder information on the banks’ respective websites, Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
(CHIL), a state-owned investment company, control 67.77% of total shares in Bank of China, as of 30 
September 2013. CHIL holds 47.2%, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) holds 46.9% of A-shares in ICBC, as 
of 30 June 2013 (A-shares account for 75.2% of total shares). According to ABCs annual report for 2012, 82.7% 
of the shares in the bank are state-owned shares, owned either by CHIL or MOF as of 31 December 2012. CHIL 
is also the controlling shareholder of CCB, with 57.21% of the shares, as of 31 December 2012, according to 
their 2012 annual report.  
 
12 The ranking in Forbes Global 2000 list is based on an equal weighting of four metrics; sales, profits, assets and 
market value. For further information about the ranking system, see 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andreamurphy/2014/05/07/global-2000-how-we-crunch-the-numbers/ 
13 The higher loss absorbency requirements will be implemented on 1 Jan 2016  (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2013) 
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the banking sector in China. 
 
The restriction on deposit rates has also led people to seek alternative investments where they 
can get a higher return on their money. According to the article “China’s big banks: Giant 
reality-check” in The Economist (2013), savers have sought riskier alternatives, like real 
estate and shadow banking instruments known as “wealth-management” products. Also, 
Alibaba and Tencent, two Chinese internet giants, offer their customers the opportunity to 
divert their cash into high-interest funds.  
According to Naughton (2007, p. 456ff), in addition to the “Big Four”, the banking system in 
China consists of 1114 joint-stock commercial banks, established between 1986 and 2001, 
which are not owned by the national government, but typically have mixed ownership 
consisting of local governments, government agencies, SOEs, and non-state enterprises. There 
are about 100 city banks, which are mostly owned by local governments and operate locally, 
and at a smaller scale than the joint-stock commercial banks. There are also three policy 
banks, which were set up by the government in order to free the “Big Four” from policy 
lending, when they were commercialized. There are also some other categories of banks, such 
as rural banks, rural credit cooperatives, and some foreign banks, representing a smaller 
portion of the banking sector (China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2012, p. 119).  
 
4.1 Informal financial system 
Many privately owned firms in China have difficulty obtaining bank loans, and some rely on 
other credit markets outside the banking sector in what might be called the informal financial 
system. Ayyagari et al. (2010) describe the informal financial system as consisting of informal 
banks that operate illegally, pawnbrokers, moneylenders and private money houses.  
The informal financial system alleviates some of the private firms’ credit constraints, by 
providing credit trough alternative sources. However the interest rates can be much higher 
than what is normally charged by banks (Ayyagari et al., 2010).  
                                               
14 There are now 12 joint-stock commercial banks according to China Banking Regulatory Commission 2011 
Annual Report (China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2012, p. 129). 
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Allen et al. (2005) finds that the banking system mostly channels funds to the state and listed 
sector, and out of total bank credit to GDP ratio of 1.11, the ratio of credit going to the private 
sector is only 0.24. In a more recent paper by some of the same authors, Allen et al. (2012) 
study the performance of the “Hybrid Sector”. They define the Hybrid Sector as all non-state, 
non-listed firms, including private or individually owned firms and firms that are partially 
owned by local governments, such as Township Village Enterprises (TVEs). They find that 
the Hybrid Sector is more productive than the state and listed sectors, and also dominant in 
size with a total output in 2009 of almost $5.7 trillion for the Hybrid Sector, compared to $2.5 
trillion in the state and listed sector. The most common source of funds to the Hybrid Sector is 
their own retained earnings; however for newly started businesses informal credit channels 
such as borrowing from family, friends or unofficial lenders are also important.   
The informal financial system can be considered a part of what is known as the shadow 
banking system. The Financial Stability Board (2011) broadly defines shadow banking as, 
“credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system”.  
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5 Literature review 
5.1 Defying China’s comparative advantage 
The central role of the financial systems is to perform the function of reallocating the 
resources of economic units with surplus funds (savers) to economic units with funding needs 
(borrowers) (Allen and Santomero, 1999).  In order to achieve an optimal result, such a 
reallocation must go to those who can put those resources to best use.  Lin (2012, p. 211) 
attributes efficient capital allocation to be the most fundamental function of the financial 
system.  
“An efficient financial system must be able to allocate limited financial resources to 
the most dynamic industrial sectors in the economy and to the most capable entrepreneurs in 
those sectors” (Lin, 2012, p. 212).  
Naughton (2007, p. 449 ff) explains how China’s financial system has remained dominated by 
banks, and especially state-owned banks. He claims that the banking sector has been one of 
the most protected and overregulated industries in China, protected from international 
competition.  
 
Lin (2012, p. 208f) says that as much as 80% of bank loans have gone to SOEs, making it 
difficult for private enterprises to get loans from the banks. He explains that the industrial 
strategy during the planned economy years, of prioritizing capital intensive heavy industry, 
created a huge demand for capital for investments in the SOEs, however, it did not create 
enough jobs. The government thus decided to employ more labor than actually needed in 
these SOEs in order to avoid unemployment (Lin, 2012, p. 199). During the planned economy 
period employing too many people was not a problem for the SOEs, as it was paid for by 
government transfers. After the reform of the economic system started, however, the SOEs 
faced what Lin (2012, p. 199) describes as two types of burdens. The “strategic burden” of 
being mainly involved in capital-intensive industries, which is not favorable, due to China 
being very rich on labor, and very poor in capital, thus defying China’s natural comparative 
advantage. The second burden, he calls the “social burden”, which is the SOEs’ responsibility 
for pensions and redundant employees. Lin (2012, p. 199) claims that these burdens would 
have resulted in losses for the SOEs in competitive markets. Thus the government gave the 
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SOEs favorable treatment in the banking market, in order to alleviate the burdens laid on them 
by the government. How big a disadvantage these burdens lay on the SOEs is difficult for the 
government to figure out exactly, and this creates an opportunity for the SOEs to blame any 
losses on the extra burden. Lin (2012, p. 199) points out that this creates the potential of a soft 
budget constraint for the SOEs, meaning that loss making enterprises do not go bankrupt, but 
may be bailed out, or given additional bank loans, due to the governments’ influence in the 
banking sector. I will return to the issue of soft budget constraints in chapter 7. 
5.2 The effects of government intervention on bank 
lending  
There are several empirical and theoretical studies of how financial development affects 
economic growth. Wurgler (2000) shows that the efficiency of allocation tends to be 
positively correlated with the financial development in a country, and that capital allocation 
improves as state ownership is reduced. Using data from 47 countries from 1976 through 
1993, Levine and Zervos (1998) find that banking development, which they define as the ratio 
of bank loans to private firms relative to GDP, is significantly correlated with economic 
growth.  
Allen et al. (2005) claims that: “China is an important counterexample to the findings in the 
law, institutions, finance and growth literature: Neither its legal nor financial system is well 
developed, yet it has one of the fastest growing economies”. They show that growth in the 
private sector has exceeded that of the state and listed sectors, despite that the private sector 
relies on relatively poor financial and legal institutions. They explain that the role of 
reputation and relationships is important, and that borrowing from friends and family has been 
efficient particularly for start-up firms. In a survey they find that bank finance is also an 
important source of credit, but that most of those who could get bank finance from state-
owned banks, already had established relationships with the banks. The most important source 
of funding for the private sector is what they call self-fundraising. Self-fundraising includes 
capital raised from local governments, communities, other investors and retained earnings. 
Zhou (2009), however, suggests that the private firms’ primary reliance on internal funds may 
just be an indication of them being wealth constrained. Zhou (2009) also shows that having 
political connections help private entrepreneurs obtain bank loans.  
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The private sector in China has limited access to bank finance, however, it has been growing 
faster than the SOEs despite this handicap, and Allen et al. (2005) argue that alternative 
financing channels may help explain how China has been able to grow at such high rates, 
where the private firms have contributed to the largest share of growth.  
Using data from a survey conducted in 2003 by the World Bank, Ayyagari et al. (2010) find 
that the relatively small portion of private firms that have access to bank loans, grow faster 
and with higher reinvestment rates, than firms that do not have such access. They do not find 
evidence that firms borrowing from alternative financing channels obtain faster growth. 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) control their findings for reversed causality, i.e., the possibility that 
banks provide credit to the best performing firms, rather than bank credit leading to improved 
performance. In order to measure the effect of bank credit on firms’ performance, they try to 
investigate whether firms which have obtained their finance from banks perform15 better than 
firms which have not. Since the firms that obtain bank credit are not randomly determined, 
any direct estimation of the effect of bank credit on firm performance would be biased. 
Seeking to avoid any selection bias, they use collateral requirements16 as an instrumental 
variable for bank finance, which they claim is correlated with bank financing, yet not 
correlated with the growth opportunities of the firms. They also check whether the Chinese 
government affects the banks’ lending by directing the banks to lend to certain firms with 
good credit ratings. They find that firms with bank financing on average grow 10% faster than 
firms without bank finance, while the share of firms that report having received government 
help in obtaining bank finance grow on average 7.5% faster, thus providing evidence that the 
association between bank finance and growth is not driven by the governments’ selection of 
fast growing firms. They also make the point that the relation between the fastest growing 
firms, regardless of causation, and bank credit, by revealed preferences shows that these firms 
prefer bank credit to informal sources of finance. 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) define informal financing as one that is not associated with a delegated 
monitor, while formal financing is. Further, informal financing use self-enforcing contracts, 
where the borrower’s ability to obtain a loan depends on trust and reputation. The degree of 
legality in the informal financial sector varies, from legal sources such as interpersonal 
                                               
15 Ayyagari et al. (2005) measure the performance of firms using sales growth, supplemented by labor 
productivity growth and reinvestment rate.   
16 Ayyagari et al. (2005) find that the most important reason why banks reject loan applications is due to lack of 
collateral. In the informal financial system, on the other hand, collateral is much less important.  
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lending and pawn shops, to illegal institutions such as money houses and underground lending 
organizations that are not sanctioned by the government. In some cases the lender uses 
unconventional methods such as coercion and violence to make sure they are repaid. The 
main findings of Ayyegari et al. (2010) is not that the Chinese growth experience has been 
driven by credit from the banks, since only a small share of private firms actually have access 
to the formal financial system, but that those who do obtain formal financing through banks 
are associated with higher growth compared with those who only get financing from informal 
channels. The findings from Allen et al. (2005) and Ayyagari et al. (2010)  suggests that a 
firm will prefer to obtain financing from banks, but that the informal markets provide a 
second best alternative for those who cannot access bank finance.  
Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) find that the state-dominated financial system tends to 
allocate capital systematically away from more productive regions towards less productive 
ones. They claim that this allocation practice is mainly to favor inefficient SOEs. They 
provide the hypothesis that the state has objectives other than maximizing economic 
efficiency. They suggest three other potential objectives. First, the government may want to 
channel funds towards poor regions as a measure to reduce poverty. Second, the SOEs could 
obtain preferential treatment due to their important political status, even if they are not 
effective. The SOEs are less productive on average and would have trouble competing for 
funds in a well-functioning capital market, however, the government may channel capital 
systematically to SOEs out of other concerns than profit maximization, such as avoiding the 
negative effects on employment. Third, the government could direct capital flows in favor of 
a particular industrial structure. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) casts doubt on the view that 
Chinese financial systems functions effectively, and conclude that an investment allocation 
rule by the government that favors SOEs would systematically allocate capital away from 
more productive regions towards less productive ones. In that sense a smaller role of 
government in the allocation of capital might increase the efficiency and growth rate of the 
economy.  
Dobson and Kashyap (2006) assess the developments of the reform of the Chinese banking 
system in two ways. The first is optimistic, and argue that the Chinese authorities can afford 
to reform the state-owned banks gradually because of the economy’s growth momentum, the 
small public sector debt-to-GDP ratio, the size of China’s foreign exchange reserves, and the 
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large volume of domestic savings. Figure 1 shows China’s annual GDP growth from 1978 
until 2012. Figure 2 shows the nominal increase in GDP since 1990, and until 2012. 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators  
Figure 1: China’s economic growth 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators  
Figure 2: China’s nominal GDP 
 
The second assessment is less optimistic, and is concerned with the depth of reforms and bank 
restructuring that remain. An efficient banking system is essential to the efficient allocation of 
capital and the transmission of monetary policy. Dobson and Kashyap (2006) are skeptical 
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about the gradual banking reform in China. They show that the dependence of China’s SOEs 
on the state-owned banks for their working capital means that the banks are forced to satisfy 
contradictory objectives: financing employment and social stability while transforming 
themselves into commercially viable corporate entities.  
Allen et al. (2005) and Dobson & Kashyap (2006) mention nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
within the Big Four state-owned banks as one of the biggest problems in the Chinese banking 
sector. Loans to SOEs that did not make profits, due to either political or other noneconomic 
reasons, made the value of NPLs reach 19 % of GDP in 200217, according to Naughton (2007, 
p. 462). The amount of NPLs has been falling drastically since then, and according to figures 
from the World Bank,18 the amount of nonperforming loans to total gross loans was as low as 
0.9% as of 2012.  
 
  Nonperforming bank loans to total gross loans (%)  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
13.2 8.6 7.1 6.2 2.4 1.6 1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Figure 3: Nonperforming bank loans to total gross loans (%) in China 
There are however some new concerns about the quality of bank loans in China, and 
according to an article in The Wall Street Journal19 (2013), some investors and analysts point 
                                               
17 2.3 trillion CNY (Naughton, 2007, p. 462). 
18 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS/countries/1W?display=default 
19 Koons, C. for The Wall Street Journal Online (Dec. 3, 2013): Skepticism on China’s Nonperforming loans, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304355104579235084041750444 
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out that debt is being rolled over, and this could be a problem if banks suddenly decide to put 
a halt to such lending, which could potentially lead to an increase in nonperforming loans 
again.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) describe China as financially repressed, since most citizens are 
very limited as to the range of financial assets they can invest in, with low-interest bank 
deposits and cash essentially the only choices. Under financial repression the government can 
obtain large amounts of resources by exploiting their monopoly over savings vehicles. The 
interest rates on bank deposits remain tightly regulated. However, according to a speech by 
the governor of the PBC, the tightly controlled interest rate ceiling on deposits may be 
removed within a few years (Bloomberg, March 11th 2014).  
An efficient allocation would allow the agent with the highest marginal willingness to pay to 
obtain the good. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed, however, that when it comes to the 
allocation of bank loans, increasing the price, i.e., the interest rate of a loan, in order to get 
demand to equal supply, does not necessarily imply an efficient allocation. A profit 
maximizing bank, might increase profits by lowering the interest rate on loans, because at 
higher interest rates only more risky borrowers want to borrow, thus lowering the interest rate, 
and rationing out credit can be the bank’s preferable option.  
5.3 Misallocation and total factor productivity 
There has been published several papers in recent years, discussing the impact of 
misallocation of resources in China. I will present some of them in order to show how large 
the effects have been estimated to be. Dollar and Wei (2007) find, using a survey of 
accounting information from 2002 to 2004 covering 12400 firms in 120 Chinese cities, that 
by obtaining a more efficient allocation of capital, where capital is transferred from SOEs to 
private firms, the growth rate of GDP could be raised by 5 percentage points. Due to China’s 
relatively high growth rate of GDP they question the desirability of increasing the GDP 
growth rate further, but show that alternatively the capital stock could be reduced by 8% 
without reducing economic growth, which would free more resources to, e.g., raise 
consumption.  
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) measure the impact of resource misallocation in China (and India) 
on total factor productivity (TFP). Using plant-level data from the Chinese Industrial Survey 
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(1998-2005) and U.S. Census of manufacturing (1977, 1987 and 1997), they find that if 
capital and labor had been reallocated to equalize marginal products across production plants 
to the extent observed in the U.S., TFP could be increased by 30-45% in China. They mention 
preferential credit markets towards SOEs as one possible explanation of the misallocation. 
They also find evidence that China may have increased TFP by 1.4% per year in 
manufacturing between 1998 and 2005 through improved resource allocation, indicating that 
things have been moving in a desirable direction. 
TFP is not directly measurable, but in a neoclassical production function it is the residual part 
of output growth, the part that cannot be explained by increased factor inputs.  
   =    (  ,   ) 
This implies that if two countries with equal amounts of factor inputs, e.g., capital,   and 
labor,  , have different output,  , the difference in output is due to a difference in TFP,  . 
Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) show that TFP differences between countries can be 
explained by either (1) differences in the speed of adopting new technology, (2) differences in 
the efficiency of operating the technology, or (3) due to inefficient allocation of resources 
within the country. According to the third explanation, aggregate TFP in a country can be 
increased if the input factors are allocated towards the firms that can use them most 
efficiently.  
Dollar and Wei (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that distortions in capital 
allocation in China result in reduced investment efficiency. Dollar and Wei (2007) suggest 
improving resource allocation either by privatizing SOEs, reallocating capital from the state 
to the private sector, remove distortions faced by private firms or change the incentives faced 
by managers of SOEs.  
Song et al. (2011) provides a model that helps explain the “puzzle” of a growing foreign 
surplus in China. It is a puzzle because China’s growing foreign surplus goes against both the 
predictions of an open economy model, which predicts that money would flow into China, 
due to the high return on capital, and the predictions of a closed economy model, which 
predicts that a high investment rate would lead to a fall in the return to capital, neither of 
which is observed in China (Song et al., 2011). Their paper also argue that resource 
misallocation leads to low aggregate TFP, and that a country starting out with severe 
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inefficiencies can potentially grow fast over a long period of time by shifting factors of 
production from less productive towards more productive firms. The focal point of their paper 
is the reallocation of capital and labor within the manufacturing sector, where they propose 
that domestic private enterprises grow faster than SOEs, but have less access to external 
finance. They show that the SOEs have three times as large share of their investments 
financed through bank loans, as do the private firms. In 2006 the capital to output ratio was 
1.75 for SOEs and 0.67 for private firms, and the capital per worker was about 5 times larger 
in SOEs than the private firms. The large discrepancy can, however, not only be explained by 
the restricted access of bank loans to private firms, but also partly by the relatively large share 
of private firms in the labor intensive sector, and the relatively large share of SOEs in the 
capital intensive sector (Song et al., 2011).  
Looking to explain some of the imbalances of the Chinese economy, Brandt and Zhu (2010) 
analyze the resource misallocation between SOEs and private firms. They find that the most 
important reason for the high growth in China the past three decades is attributed to the high 
TFP growth in the non-agricultural private sector, as well as a large shift of labor from the 
agricultural sector as well as from the state sector to this part of the private sector. They find 
that the TFP growth in the non-agricultural state sector grew at an annual rate of 1.52 %, 
between 1978 and 2007, and that the non-agricultural private sector’s TFP growth rate was 
4.56 % over the same period. The great misallocation of resources towards the state sector has 
resulted in a much lower capital-labor ratio in the private sector, than the state sector. In 2007, 
the state’s share of non-agricultural fixed investment was 53 % of total investment, even 
though their employment share was only 13 %. They suggest that reallocation of resources 
towards the private sector could result in significant gains.  
Brandt et al. (2013) measure the distortions in the allocation of capital and labor across 
sectors and provinces in China between 1985 and 2007. They find that allocation distortions 
reduced aggregate TFP by 30% on average in this time period. This is however not only due 
to capital misallocation, but part of it is due to labor allocation distortions. Remember that 
there have been restrictions in the movement of labor within China, due to the hukou system 
as was shortly described in chapter 3.2.  
Brandt et al. (2013) distinguish distortions as “between province” and “within province inter 
sectoral” distortions, where the sectors are either state or non-state. They find that the 
“between province” distortions are mostly due to labor market distortions, while “within 
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province inter sectoral” distortions are mostly due to the misallocation of capital between the 
state and non-state sector.   
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6 The role of banks 
Since the banks are a major part of the Chinese financial system, it is interesting to consider 
some of the special roles banks play in the economy. If a firm wants to borrow money to 
finance a project, they may obtain that finance directly from savers by selling them bonds, or 
indirectly by borrow through a bank. If a saver invests directly in a project, the financial 
return should be higher than the return the saver can alternatively obtain from placing her 
money in bank deposits, because the bank will take some share of the revenue. So why do 
many savers prefer to lend their money through a bank, rather than investing directly in a 
business? Rødseth (2013) provides four important reasons: (1) Liquidity, (2) diversification, 
(3) screening and (4) monitoring.  
In order to understand the meaning of these key words, consider the following short example. 
A saver wants to obtain a positive return on her savings. She can invest directly in a project, 
or deposit her savings in a bank. Let’s assume that she decides to invest directly in a new 
restaurant. By investing her savings into the restaurant she encounters uncertainty as to when 
she can withdraw her money from the project. It may take a while before the restaurant starts 
making money, if it is ever so fortunate. If she wants to get out of the project quickly, it may 
be hard to sell her share of the restaurant unless the price is low, i.e., the investment is not 
very liquid. By investing all her savings into the restaurant project, all her savings may be lost 
if the restaurant goes bankrupt, so she has not diversified her portfolio. In order to choose a 
good investment project it may be necessary to screen different projects in order to find the 
one that seems most profitable, this can be time consuming and might require special skills, 
which makes it costly. She may also have to monitor the restaurant’s finances in order to 
make sure that those who run the restaurant will not deliberately report losses in order to 
reduce the payments to the investor. 
Alternatively she can deposit her savings in a bank, and in this way delegate the tasks of 
screening, monitoring and diversification of the portfolio to the bank, which specializes in 
performing these activities. The bank can also provide liquid deposits, despite investing in 
long term illiquid projects. 
In section 6.1 I will give an explanation as to how the banks can create liquidity, and in 
section 6.2 I will show how banks reduce risks by diversification, and lower the total costs of 
monitoring.   
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According to Diamond (2007), two important functions of banks are (1), creating liquid 
deposits and (2), monitoring borrowers and enforcing loan covenants.  
6.1 Creating liquidity 
An investment project may take a long time before it starts paying off, and can be very 
illiquid. One of the important roles of banks is to create liquidity. A saver with a demand for 
liquidity may prefer to invest via a bank, rather than directly investing on her own (Diamond, 
2007).  
“An illiquid asset is one in which the proceeds from physical liquidation or a sale on some 
date are less than the present value of its payoff on some future date” (Diamond, 2007).  
The following example is taken from Diamond (2007).  
Consider the following asset at three dates,   = 0,   = 1, and   = 2. If one invests one unit 
at date 0, it will be worth    at date 2, but only    <    at date 1. The investors save for future 
consumption, however, as of date 0, they do not know at what date they will want to 
consume. In period 1 the investors realize whether they need to liquidate their investment in 
order to consume early, or if they can keep their investment for one more period and consume 
in period 2. An investor who would like to liquidate at   = 1 is an investor of “type 1”, and 
an investor who can wait until   = 2 is “type 2”.  
As of date 0, investors do not know what type they are, but each one has a probability   of 
being type 1, and probability 1 −   of being type 2. So a fraction   will be early consumers, 
and a fraction 1 −   will be late consumers.  
Assume there are 100 investors, and   =
 
 
, so 25 investors are of type 1, and 75 are of type 2.  
A type 1 investor with utility function  ( ) who consumes    at   = 1 has utility  (  ), and 
a type 2 investor who consumes    at   = 2 has utility  (  ). An investor who holds the asset 
(  ,   ), which gives a choice of   at   = 1 or    >    at   = 2, consumes    =    if of type 1 
(with probability  ) or    =    if of type 2 (with probability 1 −  ). The investor’s expected 
utility is given by  
   (  ) + (1 −  ) (  ) (16) 
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The investors are assumed to have the risk-averse utility function  ( ) = 1 − (
 
 
). 
6.1.1 Comparing the liquidity of assets 
There are two assets in this economy, one is illiquid and yields (   = 1,    =  ), and a more 
liquid asset which yields (   > 1,    <  ). Observe that the illiquid asset gives a lower payoff 
than the liquid asset, if it is realized in period 1, but a higher payoff if it is realized in period 2.  
Investors only have access to the illiquid asset.  
Following Diamond (2007) I will illustrate how increased liquidity increases the utility of the 
investors, by using a numerical example, where   =
 
 
 and the illiquid asset has (   = 1,    =
  = 2). A hypothetically more liquid asset has (   = 1.28,    = 1.813). The expected utility 
from holding the illiquid asset is, 
 1
4
 (1) +
3
4
 (2) = 0.375 
(17) 
   
The expected utility from holding the more liquid asset is,  
 1
4
 (1.28) +
3
4
 (1.813) = 0.391 > 0.375 
(18) 
 
Each investor prefers the more liquid asset, with a higher expected utility. The liquid asset 
provides a smoother return, with smaller differences in return between the two dates.  The 
preference for the liquid asset comes from the risk-averse utility function.  
6.1.2 Liquidity transformation 
The hypothetically more liquid asset can be provided by the bank by offering demand 
deposits, even though the bank invests only in the illiquid asset with (   = 1,    = 2). If 
investors20 deposit 1 unit each at   = 0, the bank will offer    = 1.28 to those who withdraw 
at   = 1 and    = 1.813 to those who withdraw at   = 2.  
                                               
20 The term “investor” should be interpreted quite broadly in this context, i.e., all savers seeking a return on their 
savings are referred to as investors, including those who “invest” their savings in bank deposits. 
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With 100 investors depositing 1 unit each, the bank’s entire portfolio is worth 100 units at 
  = 1. If 25 depositors withdraw 1.28 each at   = 1, then 25(1.28) = 32 assets must be 
liquidated, i.e., 32 percent of the portfolio must be liquidated. That implies 68 assets remain 
until   = 2, when they will be worth   = 2 each. 75 depositors remain at   = 2, and they 
will each receive 
 [100 − 32]2
75
=
[68]2
75
= 1.813 
(19) 
 
The bank can provide a liquid deposit which yields a positive return even when liquidated 
early. Investors holding the illiquid asset directly will, on the other hand, not get a positive 
return if they liquidate the investment early. This liquidity transformation service is one of the 
most important functions of banks. The bank can invest in illiquid assets, and by knowing 
only the fraction of early consumers, it can create liquidity by offering liquid deposits. 
Investors who do not know if they will be early or late consumers will prefer the possibility 
the bank provides of withdrawing in period 1 if necessary, to the alternative of direct 
investment, where the same investor would be forced to liquidate a long term project in period 
1, resulting in a lower return in period 1. In this respect, the bank provides insurance to the 
investors who deposit their money at the bank. 
There is a particular challenge related to investing in long term projects by using deposits that 
can be withdrawn at any time. If a depositor of type 2, who would normally wait until period 
2 to withdraw her deposits, suddenly decides to withdraw at period 1, due to, e.g., a belief that 
many other late withdrawers are withdrawing early, the bank may experience a bank run, and 
all depositors will withdraw early. In this case the bank will not be able to pay its obligations. 
To resolve the problem of bank runs, the bank can either suspend the convertibility of 
deposits to cash, such that only a fraction   of depositors are allowed to withdraw early, or 
have an insurance that guarantees the deposits by a third party in the event of a bank run 
(Diamond, 2007). When the bank has deposit insurance, or suspension of convertibility is an 
option, there is no reason for those who prefer to withdraw late to withdraw early, because 
they do not risk losing their deposits.  
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In China very few banks have been allowed to fail, and even though there is no deposit 
insurance system in China as of now,21 deposits have been safe in the banks due to 
government intervention, bailing out financial institutions rather than allowing them to go 
bankrupt (World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. 
China, 2013, p. 122).  
If a private Chinese entrepreneur in need of finance cannot obtain a bank loan, she can 
potentially try to borrow from some investors directly. Many private firms in China do rely on 
the informal financial system or on borrowing from friends and family (Allen et al., 2005). 
However, these alternative sources of finance are not perfect substitutes to using a bank as an 
intermediary, because the entrepreneur may not provide the same liquidity as the bank can. 
Friends, family or other direct lenders may be reluctant to bind their savings in long term 
illiquid projects, and would require getting paid a sufficient compensation for the low 
liquidity. A single entrepreneur in need of finance for a project cannot replicate the banks’ 
way of creating liquid deposits because it is necessary to hold a diversified portfolio of 
investments. A bank with only one loan and no diversification will not be very successful, 
since the bank will default whenever the project it invests in defaults (Diamond, 1996).  
Banks’ ability to create liquid deposits makes them attractive to savers who are not certain as 
to when they need to convert their savings into cash for consumption. A risk-averse consumer 
can increase her utility by smoothing consumption, which is made possible by the liquid 
deposits. This implies that in general many savers may prefer to place their money in banks, 
rather than investing directly in entrepreneurial projects. In China, however, many of the 
private firms rely on credit from the informal financial system, and direct borrowing from 
family or friends (Ayyagari et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2005)). The interest rates on bank 
deposits in China are regulated by an interest rate ceiling, which is kept at a rather low level. 
The informal financial system has been able to offer higher interest rates than bank deposits, 
making it an attractive alternative for some savers. The interest rate ceiling on bank deposits, 
however, is expected to be removed in 2015 or 2016, according to a speech by the governor 
of the Chinese central bank in March 2014 (Bloomberg, March 11th 2014). If the liberalization 
of interest rates on deposits leads to increasing interest rates, this would, ceteris paribus, lead 
to a shift of savings from the informal financial system to bank deposits. It is then important 
that the banking sector at the same time is ready to increase the share of credit going to 
                                               
21 There is no deposit insurance system in China as of April 2014, though there are indications that a deposit 
insurance system will be introduced shortly (see, e.g., Bloomberg, March 6th 2014) 
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private firms in China. If the banks still give most loans to SOEs after the interest rate has 
been liberalized, this could reduce the growth potential of China’s private sector, which has 
been the fastest growing sector in recent years. 
According to Diamond (1996), the bank’s use of diversification and monitoring can explain 
why it is beneficial to use a bank as an intermediary between investors and entrepreneurs, as 
will be shown in section 6.2.   
6.2 Monitoring and diversification 
Allen et al. (2005) show that most Chinese private firms rely on self-fundraising or borrowing 
from, e.g., friends, family or other informal lenders. Such borrowing and lending may be 
possible for smaller projects, and for those who are lucky enough to know such lenders. There 
are, however, some problems related to such lending in addition to the liquidity issue 
mentioned above. If the lenders are small, they might have to invest all their savings into one 
project, because diversification would be too costly. If the size of the project is large, and the 
entrepreneur has to borrow relatively small amounts from many individuals, then it may be 
beneficial to raise the funds through a bank, due to monitoring costs (Diamond, 1996). 
Diamond (1996) shows that the costs of monitoring the borrower may be very expensive on 
aggregate, if many small borrowers have to monitor the borrower individually.  
According to Diamond (1996), monitoring may help solve a problem of asymmetric 
information between a lender and borrower. Without monitoring there would be a need for 
more costly contracts. Monitoring is however also costly, and especially if several lenders 
monitor the same loan. Thus it could reduce overall costs if, e.g., a bank acts as a delegated 
monitor, on behalf of many investors, who deposit their money at the bank.  
6.2.1 Without monitoring 
Consider a borrower who needs to finance a project, and establishes a profit sharing 
agreement with a lender. There is an information asymmetry problem between them, where 
the borrower has information about the profitability of the project, which the lender does not 
have. Without being monitored the borrower will always have incentives to pay the lender the 
smallest possible amount, and would thus report no profits.  
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In order to give the borrower an incentive to pay back the loan, the lender has to liquidate the 
borrower’s project, whenever the borrower does not pay back the loan with an agreed upon 
interest. This is assumed to be very costly, and liquidation yields no return to either the 
borrower or lender. A contract between the borrower and lender would have to state a 
promised payment value. Any lower payment will result in liquidation, and the borrower will 
never pay any higher amount than the promised payment value.  
6.2.2 With monitoring 
If the borrower is being monitored, the monitor can observe the return from the project. 
Hence the project does not have to be liquidated whenever the return is less than the promised 
payment value. When the lender monitors, he can accept to receive a lower return and avoid 
the costly liquidation. With all bargaining power with the lender, whenever the borrower 
cannot return the promised amount, any returns will go to the lender. Because the projects that 
cannot pay back the promised payment value do not have to be liquidated, which is assumed 
to give zero return to both borrower and lender, the monitoring will lead to cost savings in the 
event of financial distress.   
6.2.3 Delegating monitoring to a bank 
Diamond (1996) shows that having a financial intermediary, like a bank, acting as a delegated 
monitor on behalf of investors (depositors), will reduce the monitoring costs. Delegating the 
monitoring gives rise to a new information problem, however, because the investors do not 
know if the monitor is doing any monitoring. If no one monitors the monitor, then how can 
depositors know that the bank is doing its job? Diamond (1996) explains that by issuing 
unmonitored debt contracts (deposits) to the investors, that states what interest rate the 
depositors will receive, and with a possibility of liquidating the bank if depositors do not 
receive that interest rate, the bank will have incentives to pay the sufficient amount, because 
liquidation would be more costly. So with a threat of liquidation of the bank if the depositors 
do not receive their money, the bank faces the same incentives as the borrower, and will 
always prefer to pay the sufficient amount needed to avoid liquidation.  
If many small investors gave loans directly to a borrower, they would all have to monitor the 
borrower in order to get any return. The cost of monitoring could be too high. By delegating 
the monitoring role to a bank, the monitoring costs will be reduced. In addition, Diamond 
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(1996) shows that the bank can reduce the risk the small investors face, by diversifying its 
portfolio, and lending to many projects, instead of just one. Under the assumption of 
independently distributed loans, the risk of default on deposits is reduced towards zero as the 
bank diversifies its portfolio. The bank can transform monitored debt from those who borrow 
from the bank, into unmonitored debt to the depositors. The bank will minimize the 
monitoring costs, as well as costs in the event of the borrower not being able to pay the 
promised amount.  
6.2.4 How is this relevant for what is observed in China? 
Many of the private firms in China have difficulties obtaining bank loans. The high growth 
rate of private firms implies that there is no shortage of good investment projects. Some of 
these projects may not be realized if the borrowers cannot get access to bank loans, and have 
to rely on informal credit channels in order to fund their projects. There might be 
prohibitively high monitoring costs if projects are to be financed by several small investors, as 
well as higher costs of diversification. This may lead to profitable projects not being realized, 
which represents a resource allocation loss to the economy.   
Diamond (1996) shows how diversification by the bank leads to both safer bank, as well as 
lower interest rates for the borrowers. If the Chinese banks who predominantly lend to SOEs 
will increase the share of loans going to private firms, they can become more diversified, and 
thus reduce costs, by lowering the probability of bank failure.  
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7 Soft budget constraint 
The allocation of resources through the state-owned commercial banking system in China has 
given a disproportionate large share of loans to SOEs. This can be associated with what is 
known as a “soft budget constraint”, a term introduced by Janos Kornai (Naughton, 2007 p. 
309).  
 “A soft budget constraint is said to exist whenever a loss-making company continues to 
receive financing. A perfectly hard budget constraint exists when a company has to cover all 
of its expenditures in a given period from its own income” (Naughton, 2007, p. 309). 
As the Chinese economy transitioned into a more market based economy, the competition 
between firms increased. Several of the SOEs were weak, and perhaps because of their history 
with little or no competition, many did not perform very well in a market economy and lost 
money. In a market economy the most efficient and productive firms should force out the 
weaker firms. However, the state-dominated banking system would not let the weak SOEs 
fail, but instead provided loans at low interest rates to keep the SOEs afloat. With preferential 
covenants and interest rates, the SOEs got a soft budget constraint, and the allocation of 
capital via the banking system to SOEs crowded out more profitable investments that, e.g., the 
private sector could have financed, and thus resulting in a reduction in overall growth in the 
economy (Brandt et al., 2008, p. 707).  
According to Naughton (2007, p. 103f), the state-owned commercial banks themselves have 
had soft budget constraints, but faced increasingly harder budget constraints during a period 
around 1998 with economic austerity, when the access to funds from the government 
decreased. At this point the state-owned banks had big trouble with nonperforming loans, and 
in 1999 four asset management corporations, one for each of the big four state-owned banks, 
were established. Some of the bad loans were transferred to these four asset management 
corporations in order for them to liquidate the loans for as high value as possible. 
 
Even though the budget constraints hardened for both the state-owned commercial banks, and 
thus also for the SOEs receiving loans, the banking system still gave a disproportionately 
large share of loans to SOEs. Allen et al. (2005) finds that the private sector dominates the 
state and listed sector in growth, size and output over the years 1996 – 2002. While the 
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private sector grew at an annual rate of 14.3 %, the state and listed sectors grew at 5.4 % in 
the same period.  
Large banks with soft budget constraints are not unique to China. Because of the 
consequences of allowing large banks to fail, and the adverse impacts this will have on the 
stability of the economy, large banks are often considered “Too-big-to-fail”22. The costs of 
allowing a bank to fail may be larger to a society than the costs of bailing it out. On the other 
hand, if the government always bails out bad banks at the tax payers’ expense, this gives rise 
to moral hazard problems, because banks may want to increase the riskiness of their lending, 
since the gain in case of success goes to the bank’s management and owners, while a loss is 
paid by the tax payers.  
The failure of an individual bank may also have negative externality effects on other banks, 
because a troubled bank may have to sell its assets fast in a “fire sale” which will cause a fall 
in the value of the those assets (Mishkin, 2013, p. 230). This could also reduce the value of 
similar assets held by other banks, putting them in danger of not meeting their obligations, 
potentially leading to more bank failures. This negative externality effect may not be taken 
into account when a “bad” bank decides its level of risk. In order to reduce moral hazard 
banks are regulated, but the extent of regulation reveals a potential dilemma for bank 
regulators. The regulators want to ensure financial stability, but without sacrificing too much 
of the efficiency in the economy. In the act of balancing between financial stability and 
efficiency, one of regulators’ tools is the requirement of capital adequacy ratios. Because a 
bank has to hold a certain ratio of own equity against its liabilities, the owners of the bank 
will want to reduce the risk of default, since they will lose their equity in case of default 
(Allen and Gale, 2007 p. 192).  Higher capital requirements, however, lead to lower returns to 
the equity holders (Mishkin, 2013, p. 279). 
7.1 A model of soft budget constraints 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) developed a model that shows how unprofitable projects may 
be financed, due to adverse selection. The main idea is that a bank cannot distinguish between 
a good (quick) project and a poor (slow) project before providing funds to the project. If a 
                                               
22 According to Mishkin (2013, p. 297f), the term “Too-big-to-fail” was first used by Congressman Stewart 
McKinney in 1984, during a Congressional hearing regarding the insolvency of Continental Illinois, which at the 
time was one of the ten largest banks in the U.S.    
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project turns out to be poor, the bank has to decide whether to refinance the project so it can 
be completed later, or terminate the project before it is completed. 
The model shows how a centralized banking system with only one bank will have a “soft 
budget constraint” problem, which arises because initial investments in poor projects are 
considered sunk costs, which makes it more profitable to refinance poor projects, rather than 
terminating them. 
China is no longer a centrally planned economy, however, the banking system is dominated 
by a few inefficient state-owned banks (e.g., Berger et al., 2007, Lin, 2012, p. 208 and 
Ayyagari et al. (2010)), making it reasonable to use Dewatripont and Maskin’s (1995) model 
of a centralized economy, in order to understand the reason behind the inefficiency of the 
banking sector.  
7.1.1 The Dewatripont and Maskin model 
There are two types of economic agents, banks and entrepreneurs. Assume initially that this is 
a centralized economy, where there is only one bank. The entrepreneur has no funds of her 
own and has to borrow from the bank in order to finance a project. There are three periods, 
where in period 0, contracts between the bank and entrepreneur are written, and in period 1 
and period 2, the projects are carried out. The project of an entrepreneur can either be good, 
and will be finished in period 1, or it can be poor, and will require refinancing in period 1 for 
it to be completed in period 2. If the poor project is not refinanced, it will be terminated in 
period 1, without being completed. The bank cannot initially distinguish between good and 
poor entrepreneurs, which are the entrepreneurs’ private information. The probability of a 
project being good is α. All agents are risk neutral, and are maximizing expected profits.  
The entrepreneur will receive some private benefit depending on the outcome of the project. 
This could be considered what the entrepreneur can pocket for herself, or how her reputation 
will be affected by the outcome of the project.  
If the project is good, and thus completed in period 1, the private benefit to the entrepreneur is 
  . If the project is poor and is not refinanced in period 1, but is terminated, the benefit to the 
entrepreneur is   . If the poor project is refinanced in period 1, and completed in period 2, the 
benefit is   , where    ≥   . 
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In period 0, the entrepreneur applies for a loan, of size 1, from the bank, which is endowed 
with 2 units of capital. The bank offers a contract where the entrepreneur has to pay    > 1 to 
the bank, which is the entire observable profit from a good project. If the project is poor the 
bank receives nothing in period 1, but has the possibility of refinancing the loan by lending 
one more unit of capital. If the poor project is refinanced it will give a return    , which is a 
random variable that is either 0 or     > 0.  
The bank also acts as monitor of the poor project, and at a costly effort the monitoring will 
affect the outcome of    . The bank will receive information about the type of the 
entrepreneur in period 1, and if the entrepreneur is poor, the bank can exert effort   ∈ [0, 1], 
to raise the expected outcome of     where   is the probability of    . As the bank increases its 
monitoring efforts, the probability,  , is also increased. The cost of monitoring is denoted 
 ( ), with    > 0,     > 0,  (0) =   (0) = 0, and   (1) = ∞. These assumptions ensure 
that the optimal level of monitoring,  ∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that     =  
 ( ∗), and an expected 
return for the bank (gross of its capital investment) of   
∗ ≡  ∗    −  ( 
∗). 
The payoffs to the entrepreneur and the bank, under centralization are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Payoffs under centralization 
 Good project 
(assuming    > 0) 
Poor project       
without refinancing 
Poor project                 
with refinancing 
Entrepreneur          
Bank    − 1 -1   
∗ − 2 
Source: Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) 
 
In order to consider the simplest case of decentralization, assume that there are now two 
banks,   and   , each with only one unit of capital. If the project is good, the result is the 
same as in the above example with one centralized bank, and the same result also holds for a 
poor project that is not refinanced. For a project to be refinanced however, the entrepreneur 
has to turn to the other bank than the one that initially gave the loan, since this first bank has 
no more capital. If the entrepreneur got the initial loan from   in period 0, and the project is 
poor, she now has to get the loan refinanced from   . It is assumed that any monitoring done 
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by   in period 1 is   ’s private information, and not observable by   . It will be   ’s job to 
convince    of lending a second unit of capital to the entrepreneur with the promise of a share 
of    . The higher   ’s expectation of   ’s monitoring effort in period 1, the smaller this share 
can be. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show that the equilibrium monitoring effort is less 
than  ∗ (the effort level under centralization), even though   is given all bargaining power, 
which maximizes his incentives to monitor. If   is   ’s expectation of   ’s level of 
monitoring, then to convince    to refinance the loan, the repayment to    has to be 1/  if 
    =    . This means that    chooses   to maximize, 
 
       −
1
  
  −  ( ), 
(20) 
 
Differentiating this with respect to  , gives      −
 
  
  −  ′( ). In equilibrium,    must be 
correct, so that if  ∗∗ is the equilibrium level, it has to satisfy     =  
 ( ∗∗) + 1/ ∗∗. We have 
 ∗∗ <  ∗, since   hides part of the marginal return from monitoring to   . Thus   
∗∗ ≡
 ∗∗    −  ( 
∗∗) is less than   
∗ ≡  ∗    −  ( 
∗). 
The equilibrium payoffs under decentralization are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Payoffs under decentralization 
 Good project 
(assuming    > 0) 
Poor project       
without refinancing 
Poor project                 
with refinancing 
Entrepreneur          
      − 1 -1   
∗∗ − 2 
   0 0 0 
Source: Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) 
To compare the outcomes of the centralized and decentralized economy, some assumptions 
are necessary. It is assumed that the total payoff from a poor project in the centralized 
economy that is being refinanced, generates a negative “social surplus” (  
∗ +    < 2), that 
good projects have a positive social surplus (   +    > 1), and the poor entrepreneurs have a 
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negative private benefit from having their project terminated at period 1, and a positive 
benefit if the poor project is refinanced and completed in period 2 (   < 0 <   ).  
Given that    < 0 <   , a sufficient condition for the selection of projects to differ between 
the equilibrium in the centralized and decentralized economy is   
∗ > 1 >   
∗∗. If this 
condition holds, both the good projects and the poor ones are financed in the centralized 
economy, and the poor projects will be refinanced, hence they have a soft budget constraint. 
Only the good projects are financed in the decentralized economy, which is the socially 
efficient outcome.  
 
In the decentralized economy only good projects would be financed, since entrepreneurs 
know that any poor projects would be terminated, because the benefit to the bank is larger 
from terminating rather than refinancing poor projects, −1 >   
∗∗ − 2, when 1 >   
∗∗. When 
assuming that    is negative, the entrepreneurs with poor projects have no incentive to apply 
for loans. 
Dewatripont and Maskin’s model shows that the budget constraint becomes harder with two 
banks rather than only one bank. The result implies that having more small banks could help 
reduce the soft budget constraint problem. Even though there are some smaller banks in 
China, the banking system is still dominated by the “Big Four” banks, which enables the soft 
budget constraint problem to exist. This could lead to a new situation of rising amounts of 
nonperforming loans among the state-owned banks, if the borrowers rely on easy access to 
bank credit and increase investments in risky projects, rather than face hard budget 
constraints.  
7.1.2 Extending the model 
I will now extend the model of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) to be consistent with some 
empirical facts about China. In the previous model by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) there 
was only one type of borrower, an entrepreneur, but I will extend the model to include two 
types of borrowers. 
The two types of borrowers in the economy are SOEs and entrepreneurs, where entrepreneurs 
are starting private enterprises without any government ownership. For simplicity there is 
only one bank, and it is assumed to be state-owned. The bank is profit maximizing in regard 
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to its lending to the entrepreneur, but due to its government ownership, the bank suffers a 
non-monetary loss when state-owned projects are terminated, and thus behaves as welfare 
maximizing in regard to its lending to the SOE. 
Assume that both SOEs and entrepreneurs have projects that are either good with probability 
  or poor with probability 1 −  . A good project yields a monetary return,   , to the bank, 
and it yields a private benefit,   , to the borrower. As a simplification compared to the 
Dewatripont and Maskin model, I will assume that poor projects that are being refinanced will 
return    to the bank in the second period with certainty.  
Table 5: Payoffs with a state owned bank concerned about unemployment from terminating SOE projects 
 Good project 
(assuming    > 0) 
Poor project       
without refinancing 
Poor project                 
with refinancing 
Entrepreneur          
SOE          
Bank (w/loan to E.)    − 1       
Bank (w/loan to SOE)    − 1    −  (  )    
 
Table 5 shows the payoffs to the different agents. Notice that there is no difference in the 
payoffs to the entrepreneur and the SOE, the only difference is in the bank’s payoff when 
lending to a poor project, depending on whether the borrower is an entrepreneur or a SOE.  
 
It is assumed that the bank, which is owned by the government, care not only about profit 
maximizing, but also care about the employment level in SOEs. If a SOE project is terminated 
the payoff to the bank is the liquidation value of the project,   , minus the government’s 
valuation of the employment loss,  (  ), that is assumed to occur when a project is 
terminated. Where  (  ) is a function where    corresponds to the number of people being 
laid off when a SOE’s project is terminated. The idea of using the term  (  ) is borrowed 
from Kornai et al. (2003), who use a somewhat similar term that includes “such things as the 
political benefit of keeping project workers employed” (Kornai et al., 2003).  
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According to Naughton (2007, p. 185), China has always been worried about dealing with 
underemployment. As their population grew at the rapid rate of 2.5% per year through the 
1980s, millions of new jobs had to be created each year. In order to avoid unemployment the 
government provided make-work jobs, similar to that of a social welfare system, where the 
recipients have to work for their benefits, but often at jobs that provide less financial benefit 
to society than they cost. Later in the 1990s as a measure to reform the labor market, a lot of 
employees in state-owned enterprises that were considered “surplus workers” got laid off. 
Naughton (2007, p. 186) claims that between 1993 and 2003, at least 28.18 million employees 
from state-owned enterprises were laid off. The laid-off workers were connected with 
Reemployment Centers, established to help them find a new job, and substantial efforts were 
made to buffer laid off SOE workers from their new situation as unemployed. The laid-off 
workers retained some income, and often housing and insurance provided by the SOE they 
had worked for (Naughton, 2007 p. 188).   
The Chinese government has shown in the past that they are able to lay off excess workers in 
SOEs, but such action is typically associated with costs, since the government may have an 
obligation to help find other work, or provide other benefits to the unemployed. Thus it seems 
consistent with the empirical situation that the banks in the above model experience extra 
disutility if SOEs’ projects fail and employees in SOEs are fired. The term  (  ) can hence 
be thought of as containing other costs to the government from terminating a state-owned 
project, which a private entrepreneur’s project are excluded from, such as social security 
costs, or special housing and insurance costs (as mentioned by Naughton (2007, p. 188), 
potential protests, as well as the loss of pride from a failed state-owned project. The term can 
also reflect what Lin (2012, p. 199) calls the “strategic” and “social” burden of SOEs, as I 
mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 5.1.  
Consider a loan given to an entrepreneur, and the project turns out to be a poor project. If the 
payoff to the bank is such that,    − 1 >   , the bank will want to refinance the project. It 
follows that a poor project started by an SOE will also be subject to a soft budget constraint in 
this situation, since    >    −  (  ).  
Depending on the government’s valuation of employment in the SOEs,  (  ), it is possible 
to get an outcome where the poor projects of SOEs are being refinanced, while entrepreneurs’ 
poor projects are terminated.  
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Consider the following situation, 
    >    − 1 >    −  (  ) (21) 
 
The liquidation value of the entrepreneur’s project is larger than the value obtained from 
refinancing the project for completion one period later. The SOE’s project, on the other hand, 
will be refinanced because the bank would incur a lower payoff from terminating the project. 
 
The bank has several alternative uses of one unit of capital. Assume that there are several 
projects that all require bank credit in order to get started. The bank cannot distinguish which 
projects are good and which are poor, but knows that a portion   of the loans will be good 
(fast), and a portion 1 −   will be poor (slow). The probability of a random project being 
good is thus  , and with probability 1 −  , the project is poor. If the bank commits ex ante to 
terminating any loans to entrepreneurs that turn out to be poor, its expected value from 
lending one unit of capital to an entrepreneur’s new project is,  
        + (1 −  )(  ) (22) 
 
And the expected social surplus would be,  
      +     + (1 −  )(   +   ) (23) 
 
The social surplus is the sum of the bank’s return and the private benefit to the entrepreneur. 
If the bank would rather spend one unit of capital on refinancing an entrepreneur’s project that 
is in its period 1, and that the bank has discovered is poor, the expected gross return from 
lending one unit of capital to refinance this project is,   .  
Equation (22) shows the expected payoff to the bank from lending to an entrepreneur, given 
that the bank commits ex ante to terminate the project if it turns out to be a poor project.   
If, however, the bank commit to this same strategy with an SOE’s project, the expected payoff 
to the bank will be, 
       + (1 −  )(   −  (  )) (24) 
 
Equation (24) is smaller than (22), given that   ≠ 1 and  (  ) > 0. The bank will thus 
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strictly prefer to lend to an entrepreneur, when it has committed to terminating any projects 
that are poor projects.  
But such a commitment to terminate an SOE’s project, given that it turns out to be poor, is not 
credible if we are in a situation like the one shown in inequality (21), where the refinancing of 
an SOE’s poor project yields a higher payoff to the bank than the payoff from terminating the 
project.  
    +    >    +    >    +    − 1 >    −  (  ) +    (25) 
 
The above inequality (25) shows the social surplus of different outcomes.  
Assume that the bank has committed to terminate an SOE project ex ante if it turns out to be 
poor. This could be signaled to SOEs in order to prevent poor projects from applying for 
loans, given that SOEs themselves know if a project is poor or good ex ante. As in 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), assume that the entrepreneur and SOE have private 
information about their project’s type, but that the bank cannot observe until period 1 whether 
the projects are good or poor. Since the private benefit to both an SOE or entrepreneur is 
negative if the project is poor and terminated in period 1 (   < 0), no one will want to borrow 
to finance a poor project if the bank has committed to terminating any projects that turn out to 
be poor. Such a strong commitment would imply a hard budget constraint for the borrowers, 
and should deter any agents with poor projects from applying for loans.  
Given that inequality (25) holds, this commitment is only credible for entrepreneurs, but not 
for SOEs. If an SOE with a poor project gets a loan, they will want to refinance the loan in 
period 1, for one additional unit of capital. The bank would face the choice of either 
liquidating the project or refinancing, with the respective payoffs, 
    −  (  ) versus    − 1 (26) 
 
Consider the three possible scenarios, 
    −  (  ) >    − 1 (27) 
 
(1) The value of termination is larger than the value of refinancing and completing the project 
one period later. In this case the budget constraint is hard even for the SOE, and the project is 
terminated.  
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    −  (  ) <    − 1 (28) 
 
(2) The value of termination is lower than that of refinancing and completing the project one 
period later. The SOEs budget constraint is soft.  
    −  (  
∗) =    − 1 (29) 
 
(3) Imagine that there is some threshold value of    for which the bank is indifferent between 
terminating the project and refinancing it. Assuming that different SOEs projects have 
different size in terms of the number of employees, we find that projects of size above   
∗ will 
be “too-big-to-fail”.  
In the above model it is the government’s valuation,  (  ), that determines whether SOEs 
will be refinanced or not. If the market was allowed to determine where resources should be 
allocated, and the government had no influence over the banks’ lending,  ( ) would be zero, 
and the SOEs and private firms would have equally hard budget constraints. This objective 
valuation could obviously vary over time, and in relation to the Chinese economy, we can 
imagine that  (  ) might slowly move towards zero as the economy gradually transitions, 
and market forces play an increasingly important role in the allocation of resources. However 
it will be up to the Chinese government to decide at what pace the valuation of  (  ) will be 
reduced. A reduction will however increase overall economic efficiency, because the poor 
SOEs that are refinanced are assumed to be ex ante inefficient, i.e., 2 >    > 1. And if SOEs 
know that they no longer face soft budget constraints, this should affect their decision making, 
and reduce inefficiency. 
7.1.3 Financially constrained entrepreneurs 
If inequality (25) holds, we have a situation where only the good entrepreneurs will obtain 
bank finance, while SOEs will get both their good projects financed, as well as their poor 
projects refinanced. As shown in inequality (30), the liquidation value of a private 
entrepreneur’s project,    +   , is higher than the value of refinancing it,    +    − 1, while 
the liquidation value of an SOEs project,    −  (  ) +   , is lower than the value of 
refinancing it.  
    +    >    +    − 1 >    −  (  ) +    (30) 
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I have showed how poor and inefficient SOEs get preferential treatment in the market for 
bank credit. I have not yet showed that this may lead to a situation where entrepreneurs with 
good projects are not getting sufficient access to bank credit, which is the main problem with 
the Chinese banking system’s lending policies. I will, however, address this in chapter 7.2, 
where I show how refinancing poor SOEs crowds out lending to more profitable private 
enterprises.  
Allen et al. (2005) show that the growth of the private sector is higher than the state and listed 
sector, despite having worse access to standard financing channels. Guariglia et al. (2011) 
find that private firms in contrast to SOEs are financially constrained, and are being 
discriminated against by the banking sector, using survey data of 79 841 Chinese firms 
between 2000 and 2007. They also suggest that, 
 “SOEs are not subject to financing constraints, probably because of the important role they 
play in absorbing surplus labor and helping to maintain social stability, which guarantees 
them unlimited loans from the state banks” (Guariglia et al., 2011).  
Their findings are consistent with the soft budget constraint SOEs face in my extension of the 
Dewatripont and Maskin model. Why are the private firms being discriminated against if they 
are more efficient and have higher growth rates? 
I will show two explanations as to why the private entrepreneurs have trouble getting bank 
loans. In section 7.2 the private entrepreneurs are crowded out by loans going to poor 
performing SOEs, and in section 7.3 I will consider how collateral can affect the allocation of 
bank loans.  
7.2 Crowding out profitable investment 
Berglöf and Roland (1997) show how a soft budget constraint can crowd out profitable new 
investments, in a model similar to that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). In Berglöf and 
Roland’s model, investment projects require one unit of capital, and there are two types of 
projects, where   projects are good, and are finished in period 1, while (1 −  ) are poor. The 
bank gets the entire monetary return    from the projects, while the firm gets a private non-
monetary benefit   . If a project is good, the payoffs are (  ,   ). If a project is poor, the firm 
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can either exert high or low effort, which will affect the payoffs from the project. If the firm 
exerts high effort,   , the return will be equal to a good project, with payoff (  ,   ), where 
the benefit to the firm is net of any effort. If the project is poor and low effort,   , is exerted, 
the project may be terminated, yielding the payoff ( , 0).   is then the liquidation value of the 
project going to the bank. Assume that   is 0 for now, so neither the bank nor the firm gets 
any payoff whenever a poor project is liquidated. The bank can refinance the poor project 
where the low effort has been exerted. By investing an additional unit of capital the poor 
project will be completed one period later, yielding the payoff (  ,   ).  
The bank cannot distinguish between good and poor projects before credit is given, however, 
by the end of period 1, the quality of projects is observed and becomes common knowledge. 
The firms know whether their projects are good or poor before requesting a loan, but this is 
their private information.  
It is assumed that the private benefits from getting a project refinanced is larger than the 
benefits from two good projects,    > 2  . The private benefit from a good project is also 
positive,    > 0, so the firm prefers to exert high effort and get the poor project finished in 
period 1, if the alternative is certain liquidation, which yields zero private benefit. See the 
below table for an overview of the different payoffs.  
Table 6: Payoffs  
 Good project 
   > 0 
Poor project with 
high effort 
Poor project with 
low effort, no 
refinance 
Poor project, low 
effort, with 
refinance 
Firm       0    
Bank    − 1    − 1      − 2 
 
There is no monitoring of the borrowers by the bank, but if the bank can credibly commit to 
not refinance any poor projects, this would deter poor projects from seeking credit.  
 
Consider a sequential game with four periods. At period 0 the government transfers capital, 
  , to an independent bank. The funds will finance    projects. Poor entrepreneurs decide on 
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their effort, given their expectations about being bailed out or not. In period 1 the returns to 
the bank from lending in period 0 is realized, and the bank decides whether to finance new 
projects, or to refinance poor projects. The bank is profit maximizing, but does not monitor or 
screen any firms, it is assumed to not have the technology or capabilities of doing so. Any 
new projects financed in period 1, that are poor, will have to decide their effort level in period 
1. In period 2 no new projects are generated. If poor projects with low effort are refinanced in 
period 2, they are completed in period 3, and the game ends.  
Table 7. Timing table 
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
t = 0  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
The government 
transfers    to the bank. 
The bank finances 
projects. Firms decide 
effort. 
 Banks reallocate 
revenues from period 0 
between new projects or 
refinancing of poor 
projects. Firms decide 
effort.  
 Banks decide if they 
will refinance poor 
projects. Revenues 
from investments at 
t=1 are generated.  
 Revenues 
from 
refinancing 
at t=2 is 
generated. 
 
Source: Berglöf and Roland (1997) 
The assumption that no new projects are generated in period 2 might seem unrealistic, but 
Berglöf and Roland (1997) explain how this does not affect the results.  
The return from refinancing poor projects is assumed to be ex ante unprofitable, but will be ex 
post profitable when the initial capital unit invested is sunk, 2 >    > 1. In other words, one 
must in total invest two units of capital in poor projects for them to be completed, which gives 
a total return less than two. But since the bank does not know what projects are poor before 
extending the first unit of credit, this unit will be considered a sunk cost when poor firms 
require refinancing. This gives the foundation for the firms’ soft budget constraint provided 
by the bank. Because the firms with poor projects know that the bank will consider the initial 
unit of credit as sunk cost, they have an incentive to exert low effort, and get their projects 
refinanced. The bank’s expected net return to a new project financed in period 1, given the 
soft budget constraint is,  
      − 1  + (1 −  )(   − 2). (31) 
 
One central difference from the model of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) is that the 
opportunity cost of investment is not zero. In the Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) model, the 
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bank would refinance poor projects as long as it gave a positive return, because the alternative 
was an investment with interest rate set to zero. In this Berglöf and Roland (1997) model, 
however, the bank has a limited amount of resources,  , and it will not spend one unit of 
capital refinancing a poor project, if the expected payoff from investing that unit of capital in 
a new project is higher. The bank will consider the opportunity cost of its actions, and choose 
the allocation that maximizes its payoff, and depending on some conditions explored later, the 
firms will face either a hard or soft budget constraint.   
If the bank prefers to place all revenue from period 0 into new projects, the budget constraint 
will be hard, and poor firms will be better off by exerting high effort in period 0. If the bank 
prefers to give first priority to refinance the poor projects, before financing new projects, then 
the poor firms will choose low effort.  
The expected net return from lending to a new project is,      − 1  + (1 −  )(   − 2), 
while the net expected return from refinancing a poor project is    − 1.  
Given that 2 >    > 1 and an exogenous  , we can find out how  ,    and    affects the 
softness of the firms’ budget constraints.  
      − 1  + (1 −  )    − 2  =    − 1 (32) 
 
The above equation shows the level where the bank is indifferent between refinancing a poor 
project, and financing a new project. The left hand side of the equality shows the expected 
value of lending a unit of credit to a new project, given that it will be refinanced if it turns out 
to be poor. The right hand side is the value of refinancing a poor project. 
Proposition 1: It follows that the firms will face a hard budget constraint in period 1 if, 
 
    −     >
1 −  
 
 
(33) 
 
And a soft budget constraint if,  
 
    −     <
1 −  
 
 
(34) 
 
The budget constraint will be more likely to be hard if the ratio of good to poor projects is 
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high, i.e., if   is high, and if the difference in payoff to the bank from good projects and poor 
projects is high, that is for increasing positive values of     −    . 
If there is a low ratio of good projects in the economy, and only a small difference in return 
between good and poor projects, then the bank will prefer to give firms a soft budget 
constraint. This result could be helpful in understanding the problem China’s banking sector 
faced in the late 1990s and early 2000s with large numbers of non-performing loans. If the 
average quality of projects was low, the firms with poor projects knew that they would 
probably face soft budget constraints and would therefore apply for bank financing, causing 
an exacerbation of the situation.  
The result in proposition 1 was based on equation (32), where all poor projects were assumed 
to be refinanced. If not all poor projects are being refinanced, but some of them are completed 
in period one due to high effort or if some are being terminated, then this would shift the point 
where banks are indifferent between refinancing poor projects and investing in new projects 
in the direction of harder budget constraints.  
I will show that the number of new projects financed is lower when firms have soft budget 
constraints. Soft budget constraints lead to crowding out of new investment.  
Under hard budget constraints, total net returns to the banks are, 
     + (1 −  )   − (1 −  )      −   , where the number of new projects financed at   = 1 
is given by     =     .  
When calculating    , remember that under hard budget constraints, all good projects yield 
   and all poor projects also yield   , because all the poor firms will use high effort, giving 
    =        + (1 −  )    =      
In this setting all budget constraints will be soft at   = 2, since it is assumed that no new 
projects are generated at   = 2. Only at   = 1 does the bank have to decide whether to 
refinance old, or invest in new projects. Projects refinanced in period 1, generate revenue in 
period 2. All new projects that were financed in period 1 and turn out to be poor will then be 
refinanced in period 2 and generate revenue in period 3 (See Table 7 for the timing of 
actions). 
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Under soft budget constraints, total net returns to banks are,  
     + (1 −  )   − (1 −  )      + (1 −  )     −   , where the number of new projects 
financed at   = 1, is given by     =      − (1 −  )    .  
When calculating    , remember that the share of poor projects, (1 −  ), that obtain credit in 
period 0 will be refinanced in period 1. Thus     =         − (1 −  )   =      −
(1 −  )    
The bank gets    from the government, which is lent to different projects. Under hard budget 
constraints all borrowers will be either good, or exert high effort, so the return on all projects 
will be   . The bank thus gets      in   = 1, which can be used to finance new projects. The 
new projects yield (    + (1 −  )(   − 1)) which is the same as (    + (1 −  )   −
(1 −  )). 
Under a hard budget constraint regime there will be no refinancing of poor projects in period 
1, and all revenues from the initial projects go to new projects. In the soft budget constraint 
regime, poor projects will be refinanced in period 1, and if there are any remaining revenues 
this will be invested in new projects.  In period 2, however, there will be no difference in the 
hardness of budget constraints between the hard budget constraint regime and the soft budget 
constraint regime. All the new projects that are financed using revenue attained in period 1 
and turn out to be poor will be refinanced in period 2, because of the assumption that no more 
new projects are generated in period 2. Because there are no new projects in period 2, the best 
option for the bank, even in the hard budget constraint regime is to refinance the poor firms in 
period 2, since the bank invests only one additional unit of capital, but get a return 1 <    <
2 in the third period.  No poor firms in period 2 will exert high effort either, since they will 
receive a higher payoff by being refinanced, because of the assumption,    > 2  .   
    denotes the number of new projects financed at   = 1 when there is a soft budget 
constraint. This corresponds to the amount that is not spent on refinancing poor projects. If 
(1 −  ) poor projects were financed in period 0, then only what is made on the good projects, 
i.e.,      , minus what has to be refinanced on bad projects, (1 −  )  , can be spent on new 
projects, thus      =    (    − (1 −  )). 
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     =   (    − (1 −  )) <     =   (   ) 
 
(35) 
Since,     <    , the amount of new projects being financed is larger under a hard budget 
constraint regime than under a soft budget one. This implies that it is more difficult for new 
projects to get financed under soft budget conditions.  
This result is interesting when considering the situation in China, where SOEs have had soft 
budget constraints and easy access to bank credit. Such soft lending may have crowded out 
more profitable investments, both from more efficient private firms and more efficient SOEs 
that alternatively could have invested in profitable projects had they obtained bank loans 
instead. Giving some enterprises easy access to bank credit, which enables them to roll over 
debt, and invest in projects that are ex ante not profitable because it gives the managers some 
private benefit, is not an optimal situation. Such misallocation of resources will negatively 
affect the aggregate TFP in the economy (as previously mentioned in chapter 5.3), and a 
reallocation of funds towards more efficient enterprises will improve the economic output, or 
alternatively, a better allocation can achieve a given level of output, but use less resources on 
investment, thus leaving more resources for consumption (Dollar and Wei, 2007).  
In the model the liquidation value of a poor project,  , was assumed to be zero. Berglöf and 
Roland (1997) mention the effect a higher value of   will have, and that if,   ≥    − 1, then 
the hard budget constraint will apply. An underdeveloped financial market may not be able to 
obtain a high liquidation value, due to informational asymmetries.  
Berglöf and Roland (1997) claim that any liquidation that does not satisfy   ≥    − 1 will 
lead to a soft budget constraint, and refinancing of the poor project. I will show one scenario 
where this is not the case. Assume that a poor project can be liquidated at the end of period 0, 
and that   can be reinvested in a new project in period 1. The bank will then choose to 
liquidate whenever    (   − 1  + (1 −  )    − 2 ) >    − 1. It follows that a high 
liquidation value will harden the budget constraint, even if say   = 1, which is less than 
   − 1 > 1. Because   = 1 yields the same results as previously shown, where the budget 
constraint will be hard when (   −   ) >
   
 
. There can be situations where a firms’ project 
does not achieve success after one period, which would have yielded   , but the liquidation 
value may still be relatively high, if, e.g., parts of the failed project can be sold.  
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Soft budget constraint problems are normally associated with transition economies (Berglöf 
and Rolan, 1997 and Kornai et al., 2003) and because the agents in a transition economy are 
by definition new to a market economy, a common characteristics is that the economy is 
financially narrow, in the sense that capital markets are not as varied as in more developed 
economies (Naughton, 2007 p. 450).  
China has a relatively short history as a market economy and the legal system, institutions, 
property rights and bankruptcy procedures are weak (Allen et al., 2005). The government can 
invest in institutional infrastructure, and thus by improving these institutions, a result may be 
a lowering of the banks’ costs of screening and monitoring, due to increased transparency. As 
the markets are improved, the ability to value collateral and get a higher market value for 
liquidated assets may increase  , and thus make the threat of liquidation stronger. This will 
harden the budget constraints of poor firms, and make them exert high effort. 
According to Mishkin (2013, p. 223), the Chinese government is in the process of developing 
a new bankruptcy law, which will improve the lenders ability to take over the assets of 
defaulting firms. This may increase the value of liquidating some projects, thus making it 
relatively more profitable for the banks to liquidate, rather than refinance poor projects.    
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8 The importance of collateral 
There is informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and any lender is 
concerned that a borrower will gamble with the borrowed funds, and take on too much risk. It 
is known as a moral hazard problem when firms with borrowed funds, which are protected by 
limited liability, want to increase the risk of their investments, because they do not lose more 
than their equity in the event of failure, however, in the case of success, they stand to reap the 
increased gains. One way to alleviate such a moral hazard problem is for the lender to demand 
collateral from the borrower. With collateral the lender incurs a smaller loss if the project 
fails, and at the same time the borrower has more incentives to perform better, because they 
risk losing the collateral.  
The following model is from Ghosh et al. (2000), and explains the effects collateral can have 
on entrepreneurs’ efforts. 
An entrepreneur has an idea for a new project and requires an amount,  , in order to invest in 
the project. Because of the risk involved, the project will either succeed with probability  , 
giving a gross return of  , or it will fail, with probability (1 −  ), and return nothing. The 
entrepreneur can affect the probability of success by exerting effort, so that  ( ) is the 
conditional probability of success. Assume that the probability of success is increasing with 
effort, and that the there is diminishing marginal returns to effort,   ( ) > 0 and    ( ) < 0.  
If the entrepreneur uses his own savings to invest in the project, his effort level will be chosen 
so as to, 
    
 
=  ( )  −   −   (36) 
 
The optimum level of effort,  ∗, is given by the first order condition, 
 
  ( ∗) =
1
 
 
(37) 
 
Now consider that the entrepreneur does not have any savings, but has to borrow from a bank. 
The entrepreneur borrows   and has to pay interest,  , so the total debt repayment is   =
(1 +  ) . The entrepreneur is protected by limited liability, and the effort level is not directly 
visible to the bank, and thus not contractible, which is the basis of a moral hazard problem. 
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Now assume that the entrepreneur has some savings, or other wealth,  23, that will be posted 
as collateral in order to obtain a loan.  
In this situation the entrepreneur will chose his effort level, so as to, 
    
 
=  ( )(  −  ) − (1 −  ( ))  −   (38) 
 
The optimal level of effort now,  ̂, is given by the first order condition, 
   ( )(  −  ) +   ( )  − 1 = 0 (39) 
   ( )(  +   −  ) = 1 (40) 
   
 
  ( ̂) =
1
  +   −  
 
(41) 
 
The effort level  ̂( ,  ) is increasing in   and decreasing in  . Because of limited liability an 
increase in total debt will hurt the expected payoff in the case of success, but not in the case of 
failure, and the effort chosen will therefore be diminishing as   is increased. Because the 
collateral is lost in the case of failure, a higher level of collateral gives the entrepreneur 
incentives to exert more effort.  
Assume that the bank’s expected profit from a loan is given as,   ≥ 0, and that the profit will 
be kept constant for any type of borrower. The bank can choose if it wants to lend, so the 
lending will be restricted to positive profit levels,   ≥ 0. The interest rate on the loan will 
depend on the amount of collateral in order to obtain a fixed level of  . 
   =  ( )  +  1 −  ( )   −   (42) 
. 
Given that,   >  , it follows that,   >  . From equation (37) and (41) we can see that 
  ( ∗) <   ( ̂), which tells us that the effort level is higher without borrowing,  ∗ >  ̂, given 
the concavity of the  ( ) function.  
As long as the collateral is not enough to cover the entire value of the loan, the amount of 
effort exerted is less than optimal.  
                                               
23 The wealth may be assets such as real estate, land, cars, or other assets acceptable as collateral by the lender.  
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 This creates a moral hazard problem, in which the entrepreneur will be less willing to work 
hard when his project is partially financed with borrowed money, compared with complete 
self-financing.   
The effort level of the borrower is increasing with respect to the amount of collateral, which is 
intuitive since the borrower has more incentives to reduce the risk of failure, and will thus 
work harder. However, this implies that for a constant profit level to the bank, higher levels of 
collateral will reduce the interest rate charged on the loan, which is paid when the project is 
successful. This will increase the payoff to the borrower, and hence increase the total surplus.  
This helps explain why banks can offer lower interest rates to those with collateral. It could 
explain why small and medium sized Chinese private firms have difficulties obtaining 
financing from the banking sector. As shown, the level of collateral a firm can post could 
reduce the riskiness of a project, since wealthy borrowers provide better guarantees to the 
bank in case of default, as well as lower default risk due to increased incentives (Ghosh et al., 
2000). 
According to Ayyagari et al. (2010), Chinese firms typically have to post collateral in order to 
get bank financing. It is natural to assume that larger firms, such as large established private 
enterprises and most SOEs have more collateral than smaller private firms and entrepreneurs, 
and in this sense it requires no political influence or any other anomalies to achieve an 
outcome where SOEs obtain bank loans easier, and at lower interest rates than small privately 
owned enterprises would potentially be charged. Lin (2012, p. 214) also consider the small 
and medium sized enterprises’ (SMEs) lower amount of fixed assets to put up as collateral 
relative to SOEs, as one explanation why the Big Four banks still prefer to lend to SOEs.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show, on the other hand, that requiring collateral does not 
necessarily reduce the riskiness of borrowers, and the adverse selection problem. They show 
that if borrowers are risk averse, with utility function,  ( ), where  ′( ) > 0 and 
 ′′( ) < 0, then more wealthy borrowers may, due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
undertake riskier projects.   
Firth et al. (2009) claims that the problem of asymmetric information between banks and 
borrowers is particularly severe in China due to the short credit history of the banks. Because 
private firms are the newest type of customer to the banks, the information problem affects 
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them the most. Longer relationships can positively affect borrowers’ ability to get credit, as 
well as reduce interest rates and collateral requirements (Boot, 2000).   
According to Lin (2012, p. 214), it is the SMEs that are most adversely affected by the 
discriminating lending policy of the banking system. Because financial markets in China are 
underdeveloped, the market for certain assets is relatively illiquid, such as different types of 
assets that could be used as collateral. According to Ayyagari et al. (2010), collateral mostly 
consist of land or buildings, and movable assets are rarely accepted as collateral by the banks. 
If the institutional infrastructure is improved, by improving the legal system and increasing 
financial transparency, this could help the SMEs obtain bank loans more easily.  
In China’s informal lending market, the creditors are much more willing to accept movable 
assets, and there has been increased activity in pawn shops in recent years, which specialize 
on exactly lending, secured by collateral, and often at high interest rates (see, e.g., Financial 
Times, 27th April 2012). However, because the informal financial markets usually charge 
much higher interest rates than banks, it would be better if the banking system could increase 
its share of lending to private firms and entrepreneurs. If the banks adopt good methods of 
screening and monitoring the borrowers, this could reduce the reliance on collateral. This 
could help the banks choose viable projects, without charging so high interest rates that low 
risk profitable investments have to be abandoned.  
8.1 Effect on the economy 
The soft budget constraints of the SOEs became a big problem due to the mounting levels of 
nonperforming loans it facilitated in the 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure 3 in chapter 5.2). 
Naughton (2007, p. 306f) explains how Chinese SOEs went from having very low levels of 
debt before economic reforms began in 1978, at an average debt to equity ratio of only 12 % 
in 1978, and to a peak in 1994, with a debt to equity ratio of 211 %. The SOEs became 
heavily indebted in a matter of few years, and they eventually got difficulties repaying their 
loans. The Big Four state-owned banks had to be bailed out, by a transfer of bad loans to asset 
management companies established especially for the purpose of taking over the bad debt. 
The government bailed out the banks by an amount equal to 30 % of GDP in order to 
recapitalize the banks and write off bad loans (Naughton, 2007, p. 308).  
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The problem of nonperforming loans has gradually diminished, and according to figures from 
The World Bank (see Figure 3), only 0.9 % of bank loans are considered nonperforming loans 
by 2012, compared to 13.2 % in 2004 and 6.2 % in 2007. Nonperforming loans have declined, 
indicating that the borrowers have become more profitable.  
The reduction in nonperforming loans may be explained by the transfer of bad debt from the 
Big Four to the asset management companies, and debt write-offs to SOEs, which reduced 
their interest rate burden (Naughton, 2007, p. 308). In addition the most unprofitable SOEs 
were either shut down or sold, which led to the number of industrial SOEs declining from 120 
000 in the mid 1990s to 31 750 in 2004 (Naughton 2007, p. 313). Reforms in the late 1990s 
increasingly exposed the SOEs to competition especially in the labor intensive sector. 
Restructuring of SOEs as well as massive layoffs were implemented, in order to improve the 
efficiency of the economy (World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State 
Council, 2013, p. 26 and Naughton, 2007, p. 186). According to Song et al. (2011), the capital 
intensive SOEs in strategic sectors were, on the other hand, protected from competition by 
entry restrictions and this has resulted in them being in a highly profitable monopoly-like 
situation. There are seven sectors where the state keeps complete control and that are 
essentially state controlled monopoly sectors. These are defense, electricity generation and 
distribution, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation and 
waterway transport (World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, 
2013, p. 26).  
In a situation where the state-owned commercial banks have become profit maximizing, how 
can they still prefer to give loans to SOEs, if the fastest growing and most profitable of the 
Chinese firms are private firms? As reported by Ayyagari et al. (2010) state-owned banks’ 
lending makes up by far the largest share of formal lending. Even despite the inefficiency of 
these banks, largely due to the large share of lending going to SOEs, the authors find that 
those private sector firms that have been able to get bank funding has performed better than 
those who have had to rely on other informal lending channels.  
It is a restriction to the overall growth of the economy when the on average most profitable 
firms have trouble getting their projects financed.  
China has had great success with attracting foreign direct investment, as well as establishing 
jointly owned enterprises between Chinese firms and foreign firms. Through jointly owned 
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enterprises, foreign firms have got access to the low cost labor, and large domestic market in 
China, as well as China has got access to foreign technology and corporate governance 
strategies. Berger et al. (2009) suggest that such mutually beneficial relationships with foreign 
investors could hopefully also help reduce the inefficiencies and high costs in the state-owned 
banks. They find that the banks in China with foreign minority ownership are relatively more 
efficient than others, and suggest that the Big Four state-owned banks could possibly also 
increase their efficiency by allowing foreign investors a stake in the company. Such foreign 
ownership has been allowed when all the Big Four have gone public, but only a limited part 
of the shares are traded, and the state remains as majority owner.  
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9 Structural effects on the economy of 
giving preferential loans to SOEs 
I will now establish a simple model that shows how the banks’ lending policies can affect the 
structure and transition of the Chinese economy, where the criteria for obtaining bank finance 
is determined by the amount of assets (collateral) the firm has. The model is quite similar to 
one found in the paper “Growing Like China”24 by Song et al. (2011) but has some 
simplifications, and alterations. In their model, credit market distortions lead private firms to 
rely on retained earnings, since they are assumed to have no access to any external credit. In 
my model the firms’ access to external credit depends on their collateral. I will show how the 
combination of banks’ collateral requirements and the preferential lending policies towards 
SOEs may slow down the rate of transition, from an economy dominated by SOEs, to an 
economy which has an increasingly larger proportion of more efficient private enterprises.  
9.1 Model: Two types of firms and two industries 
There are two types of industries, capital intensive, and labor intensive. There are also two 
types of firms, private firms and SOEs. The SOEs are considered large enterprises with 
enough assets in collateral to obtain access to bank funding. The SOEs are incumbents in both 
the labor- and capital intensive industries, while the private firms are challengers.  
The economy consists of many different private firms and many different SOEs, but will be 
simplified to consist of one representative private firm, and one representative SOE. They can 
be considered as being averages of many different private firms and SOEs respectively.  
The private firms have initial assets     <  
∗, where  ∗ denotes the level of assets (collateral) 
needed to obtain loans from the bank sector. To give a motivation for the collateral 
requirement, one can think that the bank does not wish to lend to a new borrower due to moral 
hazard risk, and also that it will be costly for the bank to determine that the borrower will 
behave diligently before the loan is given, so they demand collateral to ensure that the 
borrower also has some “skin in the game”. Due to fixed costs, the banking sector is only 
interested in extending loans above a certain loan size, so  ∗ can also be considered as the 
                                               
24 See their Two-Sector Model in section IV, at page 233 in Song et al. (2011). 
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necessary level of collateral needed in order to obtain a bank loan of the smallest size that the 
bank finds it profitable to lend.  
The SOEs have initial assets     >  
∗, implying that it can post enough collateral so as to 
obtain bank loans. 
Assume that both SOEs and private firms have access to the same two technologies, but the 
private firms are better at adopting them. Also, because of a harder budget constraint, the 
private firms have stronger incentives to increase their efficiency, so they have a higher 
growth rate than SOEs in both the labor and capital intensive sector.  
The growth rate of the private firms’ assets is given by,  
     =    (1 +   ), 
 
(43) 
where     denotes the value of the private firms’ assets after doing business for 1 year, and 
   denotes the annual growth rate of the private firms’ assets, where the subscript ℎ 
symbolizes a high growth rate.  
The equivalent equation for the SOEs is, 
     =    (1 +   ).  (44) 
 
Assume that the growth rate of the private firms is faster than the growth rate of the SOEs, 
   >    . 
Initial start up cost of entering the capital intensive industry is   , and the cost of entering the 
labor intensive industry is   , where    >   , and  
∗ +   ≥    >  
∗ >     ≥   .   denotes 
the debt that is necessary to borrow from the banks in order to have enough funds to enter the 
capital intensive industry.  
The private firms’ initial assets,    , are thus too low for them to enter the capital intensive 
industry immediately, and their only option is to enter the labor intensive industry. 
Because of the assumption that private firms grow faster than SOEs, the private firms’ share 
of total output in the labor intensive sector will gradually increase relative to the SOEs’ share. 
The SOEs are assumed to be growing, but at a slower rate than the private firms, so their 
market share will gradually get smaller in the labor intensive sector. 
65 
 
The private firms cannot enter the capital intensive industry before they have grown their 
assets such that    ≥  
∗, which enables them to get access to bank funding. Bank funding is 
necessary for the private firms to cover the high start up costs of entering the capital intensive 
industry.  
Because of the banks’ policy of requiring collateral, the SOEs are initially the only type of 
firm that is able to obtain bank loans. The entrance of private firms into the capital intensive 
sector will only happen after the private enterprises have gained enough revenue from the 
labor intensive industry. Thus there is a gradual transition, in which the less efficient SOEs 
can keep their high market share in the capital intensive industry, as the private firms 
accumulate the assets needed.  
This is consistent with the Chinese story, where the SOEs have gradually had a declining 
share of total output in the labor intensive industries in the recent decades. “Since 1997, under 
the slogan “Zhuada Fangxio” (“grab the big ones and release the small ones”), the ninth 
Five-Year Plan exposed SOEs to competition in labor intensive industries, while promoting 
the merger and restructuring of SOEs in strategic capital intensive industries…” (Song et al. 
(2011), p. 235)   
The ratio   /   will determine the speed of the transition from a SOE-dominated labor 
intensive sector, to one dominated by private firms.  
As private firms that initially entered the labor intensive industries grow, so does their 
collateral. When they have accumulated enough assets, such that    ≥  
∗, they can enter the 
capital intensive industries.   ∗ =    (1 +   )
 , where   denotes the number of years it will 
take for the firm to accumulate enough assets to get access to the bank borrowing.  
 
 
 ∗ =    (1 +   )
  (45) 
 
 
  ( ∗) =   [   (1 +   )
 ] (46) 
 ln ( ∗ −    )
ln (1 +   )
=   
(47) 
 
The above equation (47) shows that the amount of time it will take before the private firms 
will accumulate enough collateral to get access to the banking market depends on how much 
collateral is needed, the level of initial assets, and the growth rate of the private firms.  
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I assume that the there are diminishing returns to capital. The labor intensive firms will 
initially have a low capital to labor ratio. As they grow they can increase their capital to labor 
ratio, which will help them increase output. Because of limited access to the banking market, 
they have to gradually increase their capital using retained earnings. Because private firms 
grow faster than SOEs there will be a transition towards an economy dominated by private 
firms in the labor intensive sector. The transition would, however, have been faster if the 
private firms could get bank loans earlier, posting less collateral than  ∗. 
When the private firms have grown their assets large enough to be able to enter into the 
capital intensive industry, there might be obstacles to their competitiveness that they did not 
face in the labor intensive industry. I have assumed that the private firms were competitive in 
the labor intensive industry even without any borrowing from the banks. However, to enter 
the capital intensive industry it is assumed that they must borrow from the banks in order to 
cover the initial start up costs. These costs may be thought of as large initial investment in 
factories, machinery and other equipment. 
The private firms’ ability to take market shares in the capital intensive sector from the SOEs 
will depend on the interest rates they are charged on their loans, relative to the interest rates 
the SOEs have to pay. 
If we assume that the SOEs obtain preferential, low, interest rates on their loans relative to the 
private enterprises, they may be able to compete with the private firms, even though they are 
less efficient.   
The SOEs can increase their capital to labor ratio at a lower price than private firms, but 
because of diminishing returns to capital this may only act as a way of slowing down the 
transition towards gradually increasing private firms’ market shares in the capital intensive 
market.  Thus the preferential interest rates that benefit the SOEs will reduce overall 
economic growth, since the more efficient private firms will not be able to crowd out the less 
efficient SOEs as fast as they would with no interest rate differential. 
The private firms’ annual growth rate of assets in the capital intensive industry will be the 
following: 
 
    =
    (1 +   ) –    ∙   
   
− 1 
(48) 
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     is now the private firms’ initial assets as they have entered the capital intensive industry, 
and    ∙    is the interest they have to pay on their outstanding debt each year. 
To provide a simple comparison between SOEs and private firms I assume that SOEs and 
private firms have the same amount of initial assets and the same amount of initial debt. 
SOEs annual growth rate of assets in the capital intensive industry will be: 
 
    =
    (1 +   ) –    ∙   
   
− 1 
(49) 
 
Assume that the  SOEs get preferential interest rates on their bank loans,    <     
The effects of a preferential borrowing rate for the SOEs can be analyzed in a “bathtub” 
diagram. 
 
The efficiency loss is the shaded area, and shows that the low interest rates on borrowing for 
SOEs has a cost, because it leads to crowding out of access to capital for the private firms. 
Because of diminishing returns to capital, it would be more efficient for the economy to 
redistribute more of the capital to the private firms. This could be accomplished by giving 
loans on equal terms for private firms and SOEs, i.e., not giving SOEs preferential interest 
r r 
Total amount of bank capital Private firms’ SOEs capital 
Efficiency loss 
   
   
Figure 4: Efficiency loss from preferential interest rate to SOEs 
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rates on borrowing, but competitive interest rates for both types of firms.  
 
The firms would like to increase their level of capital until their marginal productivity of 
capital is equal to the interest rates. Since the SOEs can borrow at a lower interest rate than 
the private firms, they will have a higher level of capital.      =   , and,      =   . 
 
Figure 5 shows that the interest rate differential leads to different levels of investment for 
private firms and SOEs. The SOEs can get a higher level of investments since they can 
borrow at a lower interest rate. This implies that more of the investments made with borrowed 
funds from banks go to the SOEs, even though they have a lower efficiency than the private 
firms. This inefficient allocation of capital will restrict the overall growth rate of the Chinese 
economy. As long as the preferential interest rates to SOEs persist, the SOEs may not be 
completely competed away in the long run, despite being less efficient than the private firms.  
9.1.1 Discussion 
Brandt et al. (2008, p. 698) write the following: “In a frictionless world, resources flow to 
their highest valued uses, and returns are equalized on the margins.” In the model we see that 
the frictions in the banking market will stop resources from flowing to their highest valued 
uses. The model provides a rational explanation as to why the “Big Four” state-owned banks 
   
   
  
MPC 
Quantity of 
investment 
      
Figure 5: Marginal productivity of capital and investment levels 
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may restrict lending to private firms, i.e., due to limited collateral. The assumption of a lower 
interest rate to SOEs is not explained by the model however, but it may be considered to be a 
distortion afflicted by government intervention due to the government’s valuation of SOEs 
projects, as I proposed in chapter 7.1.2. The rationality of such preferential interest rates is 
questionable, and can be a result of “crony capitalism”, rather than profit maximizing 
motives. In order to sustain a high level of economic growth in China, and thereby increasing 
the welfare of the Chinese citizens, it should be in the economy’s best interest to allow the 
less efficient firms to exit the market, if competition from more efficient firms would have 
forced them to exit in a market economy with no preferential interest rates. The preferential 
interest rates to SOEs act as a subsidy to the less efficient firms. 
 
From the above model it would seem that all SOEs are less efficient than all private firms, 
which is obviously not true, but when the model is thought of as considering the average of all 
private firms and the average of all SOEs, the assumption is justified. Allen et al. (2005) have 
shown that on average the efficiency of private firms are higher than SOEs. As more efficient 
private firms enter industries where the SOEs have been dominant, this should in reality 
provide incentives for the SOEs to also increase their efficiency. Increased competition, 
however, does not have to imply that all SOEs are competed away, as long as the SOEs can to 
improve their efficiency, without receiving special treatment, it would be an improvement of 
the overall efficiency in the economy. 
According to Allen et al. (2005), China is an important counterexample to the existing 
literature on law, institutions, finance and growth. The economy of China has been growing at 
very high rates, despite its poor legal and financial system. This does not, however, imply that 
China will not benefit from changing to a more efficient financial system, even though they 
have been able to grow without an efficient one in the past. There might have been substantial 
catch-up effects, by changing the market structure, labor market movements from rural to 
urban areas and using more modern technology, which has helped China develop the 
economy so fast in the past 35 years. And since GDP per capita in China is still quite low, it 
should be possible to keep a high growth rate also in the years to come. As the economy 
develops it will be increasingly hard to find ways of keeping the growth rate high. Increasing 
the efficiency of the financial system may, however, be an important step for the Chinese 
economy to continue developing at reasonably high levels of growth in the coming years.  
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9.1.2 Policy suggestions 
The Chinese economy is still in the process of reform, as it has been for the past 35 years. The 
financial markets have not yet become as free as they are in other market economies, but there 
has been gradual improvement for several years. The ceiling on deposit rates is one key factor 
that acts as an impediment to competition between the banks. Removing the ceiling on 
deposit rates would lead to increased competition for deposits. The increased competition 
between banks should also lead them to increase their efficiency in monitoring, risk 
management and try to lend to the most productive firms to reduce risk of defaults. Since a 
removal of the ceiling on deposit rates will most likely lead to a decreased interest rate spread 
between deposits and lending rates, the huge profits the banks could previously reap from this 
differential will diminish, which should act as an incentive to improve their efficiency.  
There should be increased equality in the state-owned banks’ lending policies towards private 
firms and SOEs to increase fairness in competition. If SOEs and private firms compete on the 
same terms the most efficient firms will succeed, while the least efficient will be forced to 
exit the market.  
9.1.3 Conclusions 
The Chinese economy has been, and is still developing in the direction of a more market 
driven economy. Previous studies show that less efficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play 
a major role in the economy, partly because they have been able to obtain easy access to the 
credit markets, through the big state-owned banks. In this chapter I have constructed a model 
that shows how credit constrained private firms will slowly take over markets where they are 
more efficient. After the private firms have acquired enough assets to post collateral, they can 
also access the banking market, and obtain bank loans. But the SOEs get bank loans with 
preferential (lower) interest rates, than private firms, and this will make the SOEs able to 
compete with more efficient private firms, or at least it will slow the transition towards a more 
efficient market outcome, where there will be a larger proportion of private firms relative to 
SOEs.  
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10 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis I have discussed some of the effects of Chinese banks’ allocation of a 
disproportionately large share of their credit towards less efficient SOEs, rather than to more 
efficient private firms. I have also discussed some of the reasons for this practice.  
It may seem puzzling that China has been able to achieve such an impressive rate of growth 
while its banking sector has been misallocating capital towards inefficient enterprises. 
However, informal financial systems may have helped alleviate some of the capital 
constraints that private firms have faced (Allen et al., 2005). Dollar and Wei (2007) and Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009) argue that a more efficient allocation of resources could have greatly 
improved the TFP of the economy. Dollar and Wei (2007) also point out that with a more 
efficient allocation, the same high growth could have been possible using less resources for 
investments, thus leaving more resources for consumption. 
Based on economic theory, I have tried to explain why Chinese banks have been 
misallocating credit, examining the problem from a theoretical point of view. I describe some 
of the fundamental roles that banks play in an economy, which make it desirable for 
individuals to place their savings in a bank to earn interest, while maintaining high liquidity 
(Diamond, 2007). Banks can reduce the costs of monitoring investment projects by acting as a 
delegated monitor (Diamond, 1996). Many private firms in China have been excluded from 
obtaining bank loans for their investments, and have had to rely on retained earnings, 
borrowings from friends and family, or an informal financial system (see, e.g., Ayyagari et al. 
(2010) and Allen et al. (2005)). Since the banks play a substantial role in the Chinese financial 
system, due to their dominant size, reducing the rate of loans to inefficient SOEs, and 
reallocating a larger share of loans towards the more efficient private sector, might have a 
positive effect on the economy.  
I have explored some reasons that may explain the large share of banks’ lending to SOEs. I 
have presented an extension of a model by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), which shows 
how poorly performing SOEs have soft budget constraints, because it is optimal for the bank 
to refinance projects that are performing poorly. I have shown how the state-owned banks 
may have other objectives than profit maximization, which make them willing to extend 
credit even to poorly performing enterprises. Another explanation of their practice is that the 
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SOEs may have better access to collateral than private firms, making it safer for the banks to 
lend to them.  
I show how access to collateral affects the ratio of private enterprises versus SOEs in labor 
intensive and capital intensive industries, and argue that providing equal lending terms to 
private firms and SOEs may affect the speed of the transition process towards a more efficient 
market economy. 
China used to be a planned economy and has moved a long way in some areas, but is still in 
an ongoing process towards a market economy. The banking sector is still affected by the 
past, with large state ownership in many banks. However, reform of the financial system is in 
progress. Privatization of many former SOEs, as well as reducing government ownership in 
the Big Four banks, by listing them on the stock exchange, show that the Chinese government 
has taken important steps towards improving the efficiency of the economy. 
Increased efficiency in the banking sector, by improving lending policies so that private firms 
and SOEs get bank loans on more equal terms, may stimulate the future growth of the 
Chinese economy. A more efficient banking sector should also lead to more efficient firms, 
making it possible for them to compete with fewer frictions.  
One way to increase the banks’ efficiency may be to remove the interest rate ceiling on 
deposits. According to a speech by the PBC governor in March 2014, this is expected to 
happen in 2015 or 2016 (Bloomberg, March 11th 2014).  Following this anticipated reform, 
the banks will have to increasingly compete to attract deposits. Increased competition should 
result in a lower interest rate differential between deposits and lending. This may require 
increased efficiency for the banks to stay profitable, incentivizing banks to improve 
monitoring, reduce lending to inefficient firms, and provide more funding to profitable 
projects. How the interest rate liberalization will affect the financial stability in China is a 
topic to be discussed in the coming years. 
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